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INTRODUCTION

While Minnesota was confronting a budget impasse in 2017,
culminating with the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Ninetieth
Minnesota State Senate v. Dayton,1 New Mexico was experiencing a
similar struggle over an item veto of appropriations for the state legislature
and public higher education institutions. Legislative staffs in both states
were well aware of each other’s efforts and have since shared their
experiences. Those joint collaborations may have led the Mitchell
Hamline Law Review to seek a New Mexico perspective as part of Issue 2
of Volume 45, which considers separation of powers doctrine topics. The
author was pleased to accept the invitation, leading to the submission of
this introspective look at the New Mexico experience.
Part II of this article provides a brief summary of the separation of
powers doctrine from its origins to its application in federal and state
constitutional law. The focus throughout is on the inevitable tension which
arises when applying a doctrine of separateness that all agree cannot, and
should not, be rigorously applied. Part III then turns to the item veto
provision (often referred to as the line-item veto) that allows a governor to
veto particular appropriations or parts of bills appropriating money
without having to veto the entire bill. Part IV follows with a review of
constitutional struggles between the executive and the legislature over
defining the state’s role in cooperative federalism programs, or programs
initiated under federal law.
With respect to the item veto power, New Mexico proves a useful
window because of its extensive jurisprudence on the subject. Part III
starts with New Mexico’s early judicial review of the power, followed by
the development of what appears to be a jurisprudence of settled
principles. That jurisprudence becomes more difficult to apply when the
political clash between the branches heighten and the cases become more
intractable for the parties to litigate and the court to resolve.
The federal-law-based cases dealt with in Part IV brings us back to
basic separation-of-powers principles: the struggle between the executive
and the legislature for an upper hand at fashioning state participation in a
joint federal-state program or a state program responding to federal law.

1. 903 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Minn. 2017). See also Kathleen Gearin, The “Law of
Ramsey County” – Reflections of a Trial Judge on State Government Gridlock, 45
MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 502 (2019) (discussing Minnesota’s experience with
legislative-executive branch disputes resulting in litigation implicating separation of powers
and justiciability questions).
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Part V draws conclusions about lessons to be learned from the New
Mexico experience.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE SEVERAL
STATES
The modern doctrine of separation of powers is rooted in the
writings of early political theorists. Separating governmental powers was
championed by the likes of Locke,2 Blackstone,3 and Montesquieu,4 whose
writings were well known in colonial America to those tasked with
formulating new governments after breaking away from British control.
Perhaps Madison, writing in the Federalist Papers, best described the
purpose of the doctrine by liberally quoting from Montesquieu:
“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the
same person or body,” says he, “there can be no liberty, because
apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate
should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical
manner.” Again: “Were the power of judging joined with the
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to
arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator.
Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave
with all the violence of an oppressor.”5
Mindful of the British king’s corrupting power, the Framers of the
Federal Constitution sought to protect against the concentration of power
in any single institution by dividing authority among the three branches of
the federal government—the legislative,6 the executive,7 and the judicial.8
This practice was already in vogue as the early states created constitutions

2. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (Thomas Hollis ed.,
1689).
3. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (9th
ed. 1690).
4. See CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS
(Thomas Nugent trans., 1752).
5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 338 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed.,
1972) (emphasis omitted).
6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.”).
7. See id. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.”).
8. See id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.”).
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in the decade following the Declaration of Independence.9 The doctrine of
separation of powers was implicit in the constitutional grant of separate
and distinct powers to the individual branches, as in the federal
constitution.10 Furthermore, state constitutions supported the division with
the addition of an express statement of separation of powers. Such a
statement was contained in the very early Virginia Constitution of 177611
and can now be found as a matter of course in many later state
constitutions.12
Whether implicit or express, there is nothing rigidly absolutist in the
American doctrine of separation of powers. Inevitably, when the courts are
called upon to resolve separation of powers claims, they all recognize that
the doctrine “allows some overlap in the exercise of governmental
function.”13 They also recognize it requires a “common sense approach”
under which “the absolute separation of governmental functions is neither
desirable or realistic.”14 Many of the early cases take a formalistic approach
9. JILL LEPORE, THESE TRUTHS: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 111 (2018)
(“Three states had adopted written constitutions even before Congress declared
independence from England, because they found themselves otherwise without a
government . . . Eleven of the thirteen states devised constitutions in 1776 or 1777.”).
10. The U.S. Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that “[f]rom this division
on principle, the reasonable construction of the Constitution must be that the branches
should be kept separate in all cases in which they were not expressly blended, and the
Constitution should be expounded to blend them no more than it affirmatively requires.”
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926).
11. The structural portion of the first Virginia constitution begins:
The legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and
distinct, so that none exercise the powers properly belonging to the others, nor
any person exercise the power of more than one of them at the same time;
provided, however, administrative agencies may be created by the General
Assembly with such authority and duties as the General Assembly may
prescribe. Provisions may be made for judicial review of any finding, order, or
judgment of such administrative agencies.
VA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
12. See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. III, § 1, which is markedly similar to the same
expression in the early Virginia Constitution:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection
of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of
the others, except as in this constitution otherwise expressly directed or
permitted.
13. State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 1995-NMSC-048, ¶ 32, 120 N.M. 562, 573, 904
P.2d. 11, 22 (quoting Mowrer v. Rusk, 1980-NMSC-113, ¶ 25, 95 N.M. 48, 53, 618 P.2d
886, 891) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Clark, 1995-NMSC-048 at ¶ 32, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22.
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to the problem by deciding primarily whether the function involved is
more legislative, executive, or judicial.15 More recent federal and state
cases, however, take a more functional approach, focusing on the essential
purposes served by the doctrine.16 This includes seeking to protect against
undue “aggrandizement” of power by one branch over another, or
“encroachment” by one branch on the essential functions of another.17
State and federal courts often find themselves well-cautioned by
Justice Jackson’s most famous dictum:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn
from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better
to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate
the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins
upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy
but reciprocity.18
The constitutional doctrine of separation of powers19 permeates many
areas of federal20 and state21 law and is often perceived as unnecessarily
15. See Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the
Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 343 (1989) (“A formalist decision uses a
syllogistic, definitional approach to determining whether a particular exercise of power is
legislative, executive, or judicial. It assumes that all exercises of power must fall into one of
these categories and takes no ostensible account of the practicalities of administration in
arriving at this determination.”).
16. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers,
1991 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 231 (1991). Unlike formalism, functionalism resolves such issues
“not in terms of fixed rules but rather in light of an evolving standard designed to advance
the ultimate purposes of a system of separation of powers.” Id. (footnote omitted).
17. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989) (“[T]he ‘practical
consequences’ of locating the [Sentencing] Commission within the Judicial Branch pose[s]
no threat of undermining the integrity of the Judicial Branch or of expanding the powers of
the Judiciary beyond constitutional bounds by uniting within the Branch the political or
quasi-legislative power of the Commission with the judicial power of the courts.”). It has
been suggested that California’s “core powers,” or “core functions” approach [to separation
of powers] amounts to a middle ground. See David A. Carrillo & Danny Y. Chou,
California Constitutional Law: Separation of Powers, 45 U. S.F. L. REV. 655, 669 (2011)
(“California courts have combined the elements of the formalist and functionalist models
. . . . The core powers analysis is derived in part from relevant provisions of the California
Constitution and partly by borrowing concepts from federal law, and the analysis has
gradually evolved over the years to take a middle path between form and function.”).
18. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
19. It has been suggested that the doctrine is not limited to the constitutional context.
See, e.g., Sharon B. Jacobs, The Statutory Separation of Powers 1 (July 14, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Colorado Law School
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interfering with the efficient running of government.22 But as Justice
Brandeis sagely observed, suggesting the value of inter-branch friction:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted . . . not to
promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of
the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the
governmental powers among the three departments, to save the
people from autocracy.23
Legal Studies Research Paper Series), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3229255 [https://perma.cc/ZPT3-AMT8] (arguing that “Congress constructs statutory
schemes of separation, checks, and balances through its delegations to administrative
agencies,” and that “[l]ike its constitutional counterpart, the ‘statutory separation of powers’
seeks to prevent the dominance of factions and ensure policy stability.”).
20. In the pre-New Deal era, the federal courts struggled with the application of the
doctrine to presidential and congressional power over appointment and removal from
federal offices. See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935)
(upholding law limiting Presidential authority to remove a Federal Trade Commissioner
except for causes listed in the statute); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926)
(holding Tenure of Office Act of 1867 invalid in so far as it attempted to prevent the
president from removing executive officers).
More recently the doctrine has been used to resolve a variety of knotty problems under
federal law. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 492 (2010) (holding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s dual for-cause limitations on removal of
members of the Board contravened the Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine);
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (explaining that Comptroller General’s
authority under “reporting provisions” of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act violated the Constitution’s command that Congress play no direct role in the
execution of the laws); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954–
59 (1983) (striking down a congressional one-house veto of an administrative regulation).
21. State courts have also struggled with similar, diverse difficulties. See, e.g., State v.
Bodyke, 126 Ohio St. 3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 55 (explaining that
provisions of a statute that required the Attorney General to reclassify sex offenders who
were already classified by judges violated the separation-of-powers doctrine); State ex rel.
Taylor v. Johnson, 1998-NMSC-015, ¶ 25, 125 N.M. 343, 961 P.2d 768 (holding that the
overhaul of New Mexico public assistance through executive action implemented a type of
substantive policy change that was reserved to legislature and thus violated the separation of
powers doctrine); Alexander v. State ex rel. Allain, 441 So. 2d 1329, 1345 (Miss. 1983)
(holding unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds seven boards and commissions
containing legislative appointments).
22. One experienced practitioner in the field suggested that “much of the frustration
and popular discontent with our governmental system is rooted in the perception that in
modern society a system of separated powers makes it increasingly difficult to develop and
carry out soundly conceived, coherent and effective public policy.” 38 GERALD A.
MCDONOUGH, MASS. PRACTICE SERIES, ADMIN. LAW & PRACTICE § 2:1, at n.36 (2d ed.
2018).
23. Myers, 272 U.S. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Put less delicately by Professor Schlesinger, the framers may have
been content to establish “‘permanent guerrilla warfare’” among the
branches and leave resolution of the problems to the future.24 However,
former Attorney General Edward Levi noted that the framers “did not
envision a government in which each branch seeks out confrontation; they
hoped the system of checks and balances would achieve a harmony of
purposes differently fulfilled.”25 Attorney General Levi also warned that:
Longing for simple, straight answers about the allocation of
powers among the branches . . . , some assume that the courts
can provide the answers . . . and can properly act as umpire
between the other branches . . . . But . . . continuing judicial
supervision . . . would significantly alter the balance between the
courts and the other branches . . . [and thereby] weaken rather
than strengthen accountability . . . [because] the Constitution,
while it establishes a rule of law, was not intended to create a
government by litigation.26
This article, viewed through the lens of New Mexico’s experience, is
focused primarily on two related areas where the “friction” is often
palpable: the exercise of gubernatorial item veto authority,27 and the
struggles between executive and legislative actors over the setting of state
policy.28 Many of these judicial struggles occur in conjunction with, or as a
result of, political clashes that arise when the governorship and legislative
control are in the hands of opposing parties, which necessarily drags the
court into a political fight. In this context, the courts are always mindful of
their own doctrines of self-restraint, lest they be improperly drawn into the
kind of interference that Attorney General Levi warned against.29 Levi also
noted the importance of self-restraint in the political branches, stating that
“[i]nstitutional self-restraint does not mean that we must have a
government of hesitancy. It does mean that the duty to act is coupled with
a duty to act with care and comity and with a sense of the higher values we
all cherish.”30 Our task, then, is to explore whether, or to what extent, the
political branches “act with care and comity” 31 when clashes of separation
24. Arthur Schlesinger, First Lecture, in CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY: THEIR
ROLES IN MODERN TIMES 3 (Arthur Schlesinger & Alfred De Grazia eds., 1967).
25. Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
371, 391 (1976).
26. Id. at 386–87.
27. See infra Part II.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See Levi, supra note 25, at 386–87, 391.
30. Id. at 391.
31. Id.
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of powers arise, and the scope of the proper role of the courts when faced
with the task of resolution.
III. ITEM VETO AND THE NEW MEXICO EXPERIENCE

A. Background
The item veto is the power granted to governors to check legislative
spending by eliminating items in appropriation bills without vetoing the
entire bill.32 It became a popular state constitutional idea in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as state constitution-makers were
confronting the perceived need to impose greater control of legislative
excesses, including budgetary excesses.33 The idea of item veto garnered
great support from those early periods onward. Today, more than forty
state constitutions include such provisions alongside the traditional
gubernatorial veto authority,34 although the specific language and effect
may differ from state to state.35

32. No such executive power exists in the Federal Constitution, but Congress sought
to create presidential item veto authority by enacting of the Line Item Veto Act in 1996.
See 2 U.S.C. §§ 691–692, Pub. L. No. 104-130 (1996) (omitted 2005). After President
Clinton exercised authority under that Act to cancel three provisions of law, the Supreme
Court struck it down in Clinton v. City of New York. 524 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1998). The
Court held that the Act violated the Presentment Clause of Article I, Section 7 because it
would have authorized the President to create a law, the text of which was not voted on by
either House or presented to the President for signature. Id.
33. For a brief explanation of the historic origins of the item veto authority, and
whether it has served its initial purpose or created a political battleground between warring
legislative and executive powers, see Stephen Masciocchi, Comment, The Item Veto
Power in Washington, 64 WASH. L. REV. 891, 892–93 (1989). Given its historic purpose of
checking legislative budgetary excesses, it is not surprising that the first American use of the
line-item veto device is found in the Provisional Constitution of the Confederacy at the
outbreak of the Civil War. Id. at 892.
34. Many veto authority provisions which contain the item veto are found in the
legislative article of the relevant state constitution. This fosters the view that “when the
Governor exercises his right of partial veto he is exercising a quasi-legislative function.”
State ex rel. Dickson v. Saiz, 1957-NMSC-010, ¶ 21, 62 N.M. 227, 236, 308 P.2d 205, 211
(N.M. 1957). Even states that place the veto authority provision in the executive article,
however, recognize that “[t]he placement of this limited legislative capability in the
executive is an exception to the separation of powers,” and therefore, “‘the language
conferring it must be strictly construed.’” Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371,
1383 (Colo. 1985) (citing Strong v. People ex rel. Curran, 220 P. 999, 1002–03 (Colo.
1923) (emphasis added)).
35. See Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1171,
1175–76 (1993):
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The Colorado Supreme Court has explained the item veto’s
importance in the context of modern state legislation, where all bills (other
than general appropriation bills), must encompass a single subject,36
thereby preventing “abuses such as log rolling . . . , riders . . . , and
omnibus appropriation bills.”37 The item veto prevents similar abuses with
respect to the general appropriation bill and helps to assure a balanced
budget without requiring all-or-nothing choices by the governor in
considering the general appropriation bill.38
The New Mexico item veto provision, the focus of this article, was
first proposed in an earlier constitutional iteration. Prior to statehood, the
item veto provision was located in the Executive Article, and it provided
gubernatorial power to disapprove a single part, or parts, of any bill
appropriating money.39 The current New Mexico item veto provision is
located in the Legislative Article of the state constitution, which was
adopted in 1911. It provides that “[t]he governor may . . . approve or
disapprove any part or parts, item or items, of any bill appropriating
money, and . . . such [parts or items] disapproved shall be void unless
passed over his veto.”40 New Mexico is among the states with broad item
Forty-three states provide for the item veto, including every state admitted
to the Union since the Civil War and every state but one west of the
Mississippi. In forty-two of those states, the item veto is limited to bills
making appropriations . . . . At least ten states allow governors to reduce as
well as disapprove items. Many states permit governors to veto general
legislation that the legislature has incorporated in an appropriations bill,
although other states limit the item veto to monetary items.
For a more current listing of those differences, showing the operative language in the
constitutions of the states that provide for item vetoes, see the Table of State Item Veto
Provisions, infra Appendix A [https://perma.cc/NN7K-UM9K].
36. See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 16 (“[N]o bill embracing more than one subject
shall be passed except general appropriation bills and bills for the codification or revision
of the laws . . . .”).
37. Lamm, 704 P.2d at 1383 (citations omitted).
38. Id.; see also Karcher v. Kean, 479 A.2d 403, 416 (N.J. 1984) (“The constitutional
line-item veto power serves the governmental need to have a balanced budget in place at
the start of the fiscal year. . . . It reflects a realistic appreciation of the fiscal and operational
exigencies that attend the striking of the state’s budget.”); Opinion of the Justices to the
House of Representatives, 428 N.E.2d 117, 120 (Mass. 1981) (“[I]f through the
appropriation process, the Legislature were able to compel the Governor either to accept
general legislation or to risk forfeiture of appropriations for a department of government,
the careful balance of powers struck in [the state constitution] would be destroyed, and the
fundamental principle of separation of powers . . . would be substantially undermined.”).
39. See N.M. CONST. of 1889, art. V, § 7.
40. N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 22. The constitutional convention of 1910, which
adopted the current constitution, considered a different item veto provision which may
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veto provisions, given that it “increased the partial veto power to parts of
bills of general legislation which contained incidental items of
appropriation.”41 It also allows veto of non-monetary provisions and
appropriation bills beyond a general annual appropriations act.42

B.

The Initial Interpretive Rulings of the New Mexico Supreme Court43

In earlier cases, the New Mexico Supreme Court found the
application of the item veto provision fairly easy to resolve. In addition to
making clear that the proviso applies beyond general appropriation bills to
“‘any bill appropriating money,’”44 the early opinions established that the
item veto is a power that may not be exercised with respect to nonappropriation bills.45 The early New Mexico decisions also established that
the state constitution allows appropriation bills to describe how amounts
appropriated are to be expended.46 Furthermore, the constitutional
language extends beyond “item or items” of appropriation to include “part
have limited the partial veto to “items of appropriation,” but it was rejected in favor of the
current version. See State ex rel. Dickson v. Saiz, 1957-NMSC-010, ¶ 18, 62 N.M 227,
235, 308 P.2d 205, 210.
41. Saiz, 1957-NMSC-010 at ¶ 18, 62 N.M at 235, 308 P.2d at 210 (quoting Brief of
Amici Curiae, Irwin S. Moise and Lewis R. Sutin).
42. Id. The New Mexico General Appropriation Act (“GAA”) for the next fiscal year
is introduced in the House of Representatives early in each session and contains the
specific appropriations for most of the general operation of state government, listing the
items and amounts of appropriation by sources of the funds. An example of the opening
pages of a recent GAA including the page showing the appropriation for the Legislative
Branch, (chosen only because it is short) is contained in Appendix B, see infra Appendix B
[https://perma.cc/A95M-E7CF].
43. Most of the relevant appellate rulings in New Mexico are from the New Mexico
Supreme Court because such cases are generally brought as mandamus actions under the
court’s original jurisdiction. See N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 3. The New Mexico high court has
legitimated that practice as “a proper vehicle by which to test the constitutionality of vetoes
or attempted vetoes by the Governor.” State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059,
¶ 6, 86 N.M. 359, 363, 524 P.2d 975, 979. The New Mexico practice is consistent with that
of many other jurisdictions. See State ex rel. Cason v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1973);
Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E.2d 120 (1940); Fulmore v. Lane, 140 S.W. 405 (1911).
44. Saiz, 1983-NMSC-010, ¶ 14, 62 N.M. at 233, 308 P.2d at 209.
45. Chronis v. State ex rel. Rodriguez, 1983-NMSC-081, ¶ 6, 100 N.M. 342, 670
P.2d 953 (“[B]ecause the Act does not appropriate money, we hold that the Governor’s
veto power was invalidly exercised in violation of Article IV, Section 22.”) (citations
omitted).
46. State ex rel. Holmes v. State Bd. of Fin., 1961-NMSC-172, ¶ 18, 69 N.M. 430,
436, 367 P.2d 925, 929–30. Indeed, the New Mexico Constitution requires that “[e]very
law making an appropriation shall distinctly specify the sum appropriated and the object to
which it is to be applied.” N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 30 (emphasis added).
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or parts” of such bills, thereby allowing for a partial veto of such nonfinancial provisions.47 A series of later opinions, including cases that dealt
with item vetoes of provisions in the General Appropriation Act (discussed
in a later subsection), as well as the cases discussed in the subsection that
follows, deserve more careful attention.

C.

New Mexico’s Modern Item Veto Cases and Enhanced Judicial
Involvement
1.

The Sego and Coll Opinions.

State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick48 ushered in a more nuanced and
complicated analysis with respect to the governor’s veto authority.
Specifically, Sego v. Kirkpatrick recognized that the governor has a
broader authority to veto parts beyond the mere item of appropriation.49
Critically, however, the Sego court also recognized that the broad
gubernatorial authority to veto parts beyond items of appropriation “does
not mean there are no limitations on the partial veto of bills appropriating
money.”50 The Sego court declared that such a limitation necessarily
derived from the principle of “checks and balances” underlying our system
of government:
The power of veto, like all powers constitutionally conferred
upon a governmental officer or agency, is not absolute and may
not be exercised without any restraint or limitation whatsoever.
The very concept of such absolute and unrestrained power is
inconsistent with the concept of “checks and balances,” which is
basic to the form and structure of State government created by
the people of New Mexico in their constitution, and is
inconsistent with the fundamental principle that under our
system of government no man is completely above the law.51

47. See State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, ¶17, 86 N.M. 359, 365,
524 P.2d 974, 981:
[T]he purpose or purposes for the inclusion of the terms “part or parts,” “item
or items” and “parts or items” in our Constitution were to extend or enlarge
the partial veto power thereby conferred beyond the partial veto power
conferred by the constitutions of other states wherein that power is limited to
(1) items of appropriation, and (2) to general appropriation bills.
48. 1974-NMSC-059, 86 N.M 359, 524 P.2d 975.
49. Id. ¶¶ 16–17, 86 N.M. at 364–65, 524 P.2d at 980–81.
50. Id. ¶ 17, 86 N.M. at 365, 524 P.2d at 981.
51. Id. ¶ 5, 86 N.M. at 362, 524 P.2d at 978 (citing Jenkins v. Knight, 293 P.2d 6
(Cal. 1956)).
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Against this backdrop, the Sego court articulated two principles that
should govern the evaluation of separation-of-powers challenges to the
exercise of the gubernatorial item veto. The first principle established that
the gubernatorial item veto should not be exercised in such a way as to
create legislation:
The power of partial veto is . . . a negative power . . . , and is not
a positive power . . . . Thus, a partial veto must be so exercised
that it eliminates or destroys the whole of an item or part and
does not distort the legislative intent, and in effect create
legislation inconsistent with that enacted by the Legislature . . . .52
The second principle established that:
The Legislature may not properly abridge [the item veto] power
by subtle drafting of conditions, limitations or restrictions upon
appropriations, and the Governor may not properly distort
legislative appropriations or arrogate unto himself the power of
making appropriations by carefully striking words, phrases or
sentences from an item or part of an appropriation.53
The court expanded upon the second Sego principle in State ex rel.
Coll v. Carruthers,54 with particular reference to item vetoes in general
appropriation acts. The court explained that a separation of powers line is
crossed when the legislature attaches conditions to general appropriation
bills that reserves to itself “‘powers of close supervision that are essentially
executive in character.’”55 While the legislature may impose restrictions on
appropriated funds, such restrictions must be limited to matters of
“‘significant financial impact,’” as distinguished from “detailed, miniscule,
inconsequential executive management decisions.”56 Thus, the legislature
may impose “a condition precedent to the expenditure of appropriated
funds,” as distinguished from a provision that deals with “the details of
managing the expenditure once approval is granted.”57
52. Id. ¶ 18, 86 N.M. at 365, 524 P.2d at 981.
53. Id. ¶ 12, 86 N.M. at 364, 524 P.2d at 980. For an interesting extension of
legislative drafting that would be a gross violation of this Sego principle, see Nicholas
Passarello, Note, The Item Veto and the Threat of Appropriations Bundling in Alaska, 30
ALASKA L. REV. 125, 125 (2013) (dealing with a draft of an appropriation bill, later
withdrawn, that would have included a line in its appropriation bill that if any single
appropriation were line-item vetoed the entire bill would be void).
54. 1988-NMSC-057, ¶ 7, 107 N.M. 439, 442, 759 P.2d 1380, 1383.
55. Id. ¶ 12, 107 N.M. at 443, 759 P.2d at 1384 (quoting Anderson v. Lamm, 579
P.2d 620, 624 (1978)).
56. Id. ¶ 11, 107 N.M. at 443, 759 P.2d at 1384.
57. Id. ¶ 18, 107 N.M. at 444, 759 P.2d at 1385. The Coll court also admonished the
legislature that conditions on appropriations which attempt to “enact [a] policy” are “not
suitable for inclusion in the general appropriation bill” because that bill “‘shall embrace
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Most importantly, the Coll court made two other principles clear.
First, cases of this nature involve a delicate constitutional balance, and
therefore the court must strive to “leave intact the basic legislative oversight
and appropriation function while assuring the executive a reasonable
degree of freedom and discretion over the expenditure of appropriated
funds.”58 Second, judicial evaluation of such challenges requires that “our
subjective evaluation of the facts underlies the principles and tests we
espouse and rely upon.”59
Thus, Sego established the basic principles guiding judicial review of
item vetoes in New Mexico: the governor has a role to play in the
legislative process through his item veto authority. This role is limited and
“negative” in nature. Therefore, the court must oversee both the improper
aggrandizement of gubernatorial power and improper legislative drafting
attempts that encroach upon the proper exercise of gubernatorial
executive-management powers.60 Coll expanded on these principles by
adding a more specific guideline for separation-of-powers inquiries when a
challenge involves the item veto of legislative language in relation to a
particular appropriation in an appropriations act.61
Such formulations may be difficult for the court to apply, in light of
the Coll court’s assertion that improperly imposed legislative conditions
are separate “items” for purposes of the item veto power, and therefore, a
veto of those items does not require the money to which the condition is
attached also to be stricken.62 This latter assertion gives rise to the negative
implication—that a properly imposed legislative condition may not be
stricken unless the appropriation conditioned also is stricken.63 This is
perhaps out of fear that it might otherwise create new positive legislation in
violation of the Sego principle that the item veto power is only a negative
“power to disapprove.”64
In any event, the obligation of a careful and detailed judicial review
stems from the court’s view of its traditional role at the core of the
nothing but appropriation,’” and such matters are “better addressed by general legislation.”
Id. ¶ 13, 107 N.M. at 443, 759 P.2d at 1384 (citing N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 16; State ex rel.
Delgado v. Sargent, 1913-NMSC-054, ¶ 14, 18 N.M. 131, 134 P. 218, 219).
58. Id. ¶ 24, 107 N.M. at 446, 759 P.2d at 1387.
59. Id. ¶ 12, 107 N.M. at 443, 759 P.2d at 1384.
60. State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, ¶¶ 17–18, 86 N.M. 359, 365,
524 P.2d 975, 981.
61. Coll, 1988-NMSC-057 at ¶¶ 24, 12, 107 N.M. at 443, 446, 759 P.2d at 1387,
1384.
62. Id. ¶ 22, 107 N.M. at 445, 759 P.2d at 1386.
63. Id.
64. See Sego, 1974-NMSC-059, ¶ 18, 86 N.M. at 365, 524 P.2d at 981.
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constitutional order to oversee the balance of powers between the
executive and the legislature.65 That task must be performed even though,
as required here, the court must engage in a “subjective evaluation of the
facts” underlying the principles being applied.66 In applying the principles
of Sego and Coll, the court binds itself to a highly functional approach to
the resolution of item veto challenges. Such difficulties are no different
from those encountered by the U.S. Supreme Court in applying a
functional approach to difficult separation-of-powers principles at the
federal level.67
Given the special nature of the governor’s item veto power under
state constitutions, a reviewing court taking the New Mexico approach may
not be able to resort to the formalistic analysis employed by the federal
courts. Under this analysis, federal courts often deem a particular function
as essentially “executive,” “legislative,” or “judicial,” and then merely allow
the labeling to determine the result.68 With respect to the exercise of the
item veto power, however, governors exercise a kind of constitutionally
authorized, albeit limited, legislative authority.69 Thus, the easy resort to
65. See State ex rel. Los Ranchos v. City of Albuquerque, 1994-NMSC-126, ¶ 15,
119 N.M. 150, 156, 889 P.2d 185, 191 (“The reviewability of executive and legislative acts
is implicit and inherent in the common law and in the division of powers between the three
branches of government.”); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177–79 (1803) (“It is,
emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is.”).
66. Coll, 1988-NMSC-057 at ¶ 12, 107 N.M. at 443, 759 P.2d at 1384.
67. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 397 (1989) (finding that although the
service of Article III judges on the Federal Sentencing Commission was “somewhat
troublesome,” the Court was able to uphold that practice against a separation of powers
challenge). The Mistretta Court also noted that “[t]he ultimate inquiry remains whether a
particular extrajudicial assignment undermines the integrity of the Judicial Branch,” and
stated that “we cannot see how the service of federal judges on the Commission will have a
constitutionally significant practical effect on the operation of the Judicial Branch.” Id. at
404, 406.
Similarly, in Morrison v. Olson, the Court was confronted with the difficult question of
whether the appointment system for the independent counsel, who was authorized to
investigate and prosecute high-ranking government officials under the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978 (since expired), violated separation of powers by circumscribing
Presidential supervision and removal authority. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). Taking a pragmatic
approach, the Court upheld the law, concluding that the President’s “need to control” the
Independent Counsel was not “so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to
require as a matter of constitutional law that the counsel be terminable at will by the
President.” Id. at 691–92.
68. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732 (1986) (“[B]ecause Congress has
retained removal authority over the Comptroller General, he may not be entrusted with
executive powers.”).
69. See State ex rel. Dickson v. Saiz, 1957-NMSC-010, ¶ 21, 62 N.M. 227, 236, 308
P.2d 205, 211 (“[W]hen the Governor exercises his right of partial veto he is exercising a
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formalism is not an option in item veto cases because both the governor
and the legislature are acting in a legislative capacity. Rather, the court
must apply its best judgment to determine whether—through the exercise
of that power—the governor “arrogate[s] unto himself the power of making
appropriations,” or whether the legislature “abridges” its constitutional
authority by subtly drafting “conditions, limitations or restrictions upon
appropriations.”70
To say that the boundaries between the two are less than clear is to
state the obvious. The lack of clarity regarding what the court might
conclude in its “subjective evaluation of the facts” in any given challenge to
a gubernatorial item veto after a Sego/Coll review could result in two
different, but perhaps equally salutary, results.
On one level, ambiguity could serve an important instrumental value.
If the political branches were to take a page from the federal framers, they
would understand that “a mere demarcation on parchment of the
constitutional limits of the several departments is not a sufficient guard
against [inter-branch] encroachments.”71 Rather, it is through the “interior
structure of the government . . . that its several constituent parts may, by
their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper
places.”72 Or, put more succinctly by two modern constitutional scholars
contemplating similar federal constitutional ambiguities, “[t]hese
conflict-producing ambiguities may themselves have contributed to
furthering the Framers’ purposes of combating excessive concentrations of
power.”73 It might therefore be hoped that uncertainty of judicial
resolution will lead the warring factions to find ways to avoid this
confrontation, which would require courts to denominate one side the
winner and the other the loser—a result which ill serves the political system
and limits the number of item veto cases which might otherwise be
brought.
On another level, the principles established by the New Mexico
Supreme Court in the Sego/Coll decisions (which essentially establish

quasi-legislative function.”) (citing Spokane Grain & Fuel Co. v. Lyttaker, 109 P.
(Wash. 1910)).
70. State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, ¶ 12, 86 N.M. 359, 364,
P.2d 975, 980 (N.M. 1974).
71. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 at 347 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright
1972).
72. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 at 355 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright
1982) (emphasis added).
73. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(15th ed. 2001).
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instructions to both branches) might provide sufficient guidance to the
parties and lessen the need for litigation over these disputes.74
Due to politics, however—and especially in an era of such divided
government—neither suggestion seems to have had an effect. Rather, the
item veto battles have continued in New Mexico, as we see in the cases
that follow. This requires the courts to either resolve such cases or find
useful means of restraint that may, on occasion, also lead to resolution.

2.

The Post-Sego/Coll Cases

In State ex rel. Smith v. Martinez,75 the New Mexico Supreme Court
faced an attempt by the governor to reduce an item of appropriation. The
governor, relying on the assertion in Coll that “‘New Mexico . . . allows the
broadest possible veto authority by additionally providing authority to veto
“parts,” not only “items,”’”76 argued that striking the “1” from the $150,000
appropriation for the benefit of the mortgage finance authority was
consistent with that principle. She asserted that Coll conferred the power
“‘to veto something smaller and more discrete than “items,”’” and that
“‘[o]ne hundred thousand is a “part” of $150,000.00.’”77 The court
rejected this argument, however, holding that “[t]he Governor’s partial
veto that would allow scaling of appropriations is invalid and
unconstitutional” and violates the separation of powers doctrine.78
The Smith court began its analysis by noting that existing “partial veto
decisions do not answer the question raised in this case,” but that
“principles about the line-item veto” found in other cases could assist in
finding a resolution.79 The court first turned to Coll, which recognized the
limit to the item veto power: the “‘power of partial veto is only a negative
power to disapprove; it is not the power to enact or create new legislation
74. Sego, 1974-NMSC-059 at ¶ 12, 86 N.M at 364, 524 P.2d at 980 (including the
instruction that the legislature must not abridge the item veto power by “subtle drafting of
conditions, limitations or restrictions upon appropriations,” and the correlative instruction
that the governor must refrain from distorting “legislative appropriations or arrogat[ing]
unto himself [or herself] the power of making appropriations by carefully striking words,
phrases or sentences from an item or part of an appropriation.”). Id.
75. 2011-NMSC-043, 150 N.M. 703, 265 P.3d 1276.
76. Id. ¶ 5, 150 N.M. at 703, 265 P.3d at 1277 (citing State ex rel. Coll v. Carruthers,
1988-NMSC-057, ¶ 8, 107 N.M. 439, 442, 759 P.2d 1380, 1383).
77. Id. ¶ 5, 150 N.M. at 703, 265 P.3d at 1277 (alteration in original).
78. Id. ¶ 10, 150 N.M. at 703, 265 P.3d at 1278. As is sometimes done in original
matters deemed to require expedited relief, the court in this case ruled from the bench
after oral argument, with a later issued Opinion “to further explain the order of [the]
Court.” Id. ¶ 2, 150 N.M. at 703, 265 P.3d at 1276–77.
79. Id. ¶ 6, 150 N.M. at 703, 265 P.3d at 1277.
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by selective deletions.’”80 The court then coupled this limitation with
Sego’s requirement “that [the veto] eliminate[s] or destroy[s] the whole of
an item or part” and prohibits “the striking of individual words that results
in legislation inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent.”81 On these
grounds, the court ruled that the striking of the single numeric digit “did
not eliminate the whole of the item,” but instead “distorted the
Legislature’s intent to appropriate $150,000.”82 The court thereby added
the following definitive principle to the item veto consideration: “[t]here is
no authority to scale back: the governor may strike the whole of the
appropriation or leave it intact; she may not conceive her own
appropriation.”83
Shortly after Smith was decided, the court confronted a different
problem resulting from a 2011 bill that amended five sections of the
Unemployment Compensation Law in State ex rel. Stewart v. Martinez.84
The bill sought to address impending insolvency in the unemployment
compensation fund by reducing benefits to the unemployed and increasing
employer contributions beyond the contribution amount paid in 2011.85
The governor exercised a partial veto and struck one of the variables in a
section of the bill that was necessary to calculate employer contributions
beginning in January 2012.86 The heart of the problem was described by
the court as follows:
[T]he Governor’s veto, perhaps inadvertently, left a void, as
there is no Contribution Schedule for 2012. Without a
Contribution Schedule in 2012, there is no basis with which to
determine employer contributions to the unemployment fund
by established employers for calendar year 2012. These
employers have effectively been exempted from what has been a
mandatory contribution requirement since the Act’s inception.87

80. Id. ¶ 8, 150 N.M. at 703, 265 P.3d at 1278 (quoting Coll, 1988-NMSC-057 at ¶ 6,
107 N.M. at 442, 759 P.2d at 1383) (emphasis added).
81. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, ¶ 18, 86 N.M
359, 365, 524 P.2d 975, 981) (emphasis in original).
82. Id. ¶ 8, 150 N.M. at 703, 265 P.3d at 1278.
83. Id.
84. 2011-NMSC-045, ¶ 1, 270 P.3d 96, 97. The Stewart court initially refused to rule
on the merits because a special session of the legislature had been called, and the Governor
expressed her intent to include this statutory dispute on the agenda of that session. Id. ¶ 8,
270 P.3d at 99.
85. Id. ¶ 1, 270 P.3d at 97.
86. Id.
87. Id. ¶ 7, 270 P.3d at 99 (citations omitted).
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Once again, the court returned to the principles articulated in Sego
and Coll to conclude that the partial item veto was invalid. The court
began with the dual policing role it accepted in Sego: (1) to protect the
governor against legislative abridgement of the item veto power “‘by subtle
drafting of conditions, limitations or restrictions upon appropriations;’”
and (2) to shield the legislature from an exercise of the item veto to “create
legislation inconsistent with that enacted by the legislature, by the careful
striking of words, phrases, clauses or sentences.”88 The court made it clear
that the issue in this case presented the latter problem of “whether the
Governor’s partial veto of House Bill 59 destroyed the whole of the item
or part, leaving a workable piece of legislation without creating legislation
that is inconsistent with the Act.”89
In deciding that question, the Stewart court turned to State ex rel.
Dickson v. Saiz90 for the proposition that “[a]ll language that relates to the
subject to be proscribed by the veto must be vetoed for the veto to be
valid. In addition, the remaining legislation must continue to be a
88. Id. ¶ 11, 270 P.3d at 100 (quoting State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC059, ¶ 12, 86 N.M. 359, 364, 524 P.2d 975, 980).
89. Id. ¶ 11, 270 P.3d at 100. The court acknowledged that the case also raised a
serious question whether the bill is one “appropriate[ing] money,” a constitutional
prerequisite for the application of the item veto. Finding the issue involving “the whole of
an item or part” to be both “dispositive and perhaps less complex,” the court noted that
“for the purposes of this Opinion, we assume, without deciding that . . . [the bill] is a bill
appropriating funds.” Id. ¶ 12, 270 P.3d at 100.
Though the court in Chronis v. State ex rel. Rodriguez, 1983-NMSC-081, ¶ 6, 100 N.M.
342 344, 670 P.2d 953, 955, found it easy to resolve the “bill appropriating money”
question, the Stewart court correctly noted that is not often the case. 2011-NMSC-045 at ¶
12, 270 P.3d at 100. For example, in a very complex bill dealing with a number of statutory
changes involving public safety passed by the New Mexico Legislature during the 2018
regular session, the governor used the line item veto to eliminate substantive portions of the
bill, even though there was no direct appropriation in the act. See H.B. 19, 53d Leg., 2d
Sess. (N.M. 2018); N.M. OFFICE OF GOVERNOR, H. EXEC. MESSAGE NO. 148 (Mar. 7,
2018). At best, there may have been some reference in the bill to either past or future
appropriations, yet the governor claimed she was acting under Art. IV, § 22. The bill and
the Executive Message can be found at
www.nmlegis.gov/Legislation/Legislation?Chamber=H&LegType=B&LegNo=19&year=18
[https://perma.cc/TV9X-3D3S]. Other courts have made clear that transfers of previously
appropriated money may be subject to the item-veto authority of the governor. See, e.g.,
Wielechowski v. State, 403 P.3d 1141, 1153 (Alaska 2017); Rios v. Symington, 833 P.2d
20, 25–30 (Ariz. 1992). On the other hand, it has been held that bills authorizing the
issuing of bonds are creations of debt and are not appropriations subject to the line-item
veto power. Fordice v. Bryan, 651 So. 2d 998, 1000–01 (Miss. 1995).
90. 1957-NMSC-010, ¶ 28–32, 62 N.M. 227, 237–238, 308 P.2d 205, 211–212 (per
curiam separate opinion denying motion for rehearing) (upholding the governor’s use of a
partial veto when all sections related to that purpose were vetoed).
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workable piece of legislation.”91 In Stewart, then, it was clear to the court
that:
The Governor’s veto eliminate[d] established employers’
contributions for 2012 by making it impossible to determine the
2012 employer contribution rate. By only deleting certain
language, the setting of the 2012 Contribution Schedule to
Schedule 3, and leaving other phrases relating to the same
subject matter intact, . . . the Governor’s veto impermissibly left
an incomplete and unworkable Act.92
The court therefore concluded that “the partial veto to House Bill 59
is constitutionally invalid.”93 The Stewart court also explained that the item
veto could have been constitutionally applied by “completely delet[ing] all
the provisions in House Bill 59 that would have addressed the concerns
described in the Governor’s veto message,”94 but because the item veto did
not do so, it was invalid. Thus, the lessons from Smith and Stewart are
clear—when the governor’s objection is to a “part” or “item,” it is the whole
part or item that must go, as well as any other part or item so related to the
offensive part which, if left standing, would lead to an “incomplete and
unworkable Act.”
That leaves open the question of whether two similar items of
appropriation in a single general appropriation act require the veto of both
to accomplish an appropriate item veto. The court considered this issue in
State ex rel. Cisneros v. Martinez95 when confronted with two separate
judicial pay increases in the same act:
The first increase, funded in Section 4(B) of the Appropriations
Act, was a 5% raise, the appropriation for which was lumped in
with various other appropriations to the judicial branch to pay
the salaries of all judicial employees, including judges. . . .96
The second increase, separately funded in Section 8(A) of
the Appropriations Act, was the same 3% raise authorized for all
eligible state employees, including judges. Section 8(A)(2) in
particular allocated $579,937 to fund the 3% raise for judges
and increased the salary of a Supreme Court Justice to
$134,922, a sum that included both the 5% and the 3% raises.97
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Stewart, 2011-NMSC-045 at ¶ 15, 270 P.3d at 101.
Id. ¶ 22, 270 P.3d at 103.
Id. ¶ 24, 270 P.3d at 103.
Id. ¶ 21, 270 P.3d at 103.
2015-NMSC-001, 340 P.3d 597.
Id. ¶ 1, 340 P.3d at 598 (citation omitted).
Id. ¶ 2, 340 P.3d at 598 (citation omitted).
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The governor exercised the line-item veto authority to strike the
language of section 8(A)(2), cancelling the application of the three percent
raise, but did not touch the language of section 4(B) dealing with the five
percent raise.98 The petitioners, including lower court judges and their
associations,99 challenged the veto of the three percent raise, thereby
seeking the full eight percent pay raise or, in the alternative, at least
preserving the five percent raise.100 The governor sought to maintain the
veto of the three percent raise and also claimed that since the veto of
section 8(A)(2) included the lump sum salary figure for supreme court
justices ($134,922) which encompassed
“the total sum of both
appropriations,” the veto of the three percent raise effectuated the removal
of the entire eight percent raise.101
The court, in a per curium opinion, held “the Governor’s veto was
effective with respect to the 3% raise set forth in Section 8(A)(2).”102 The
court, however, also ruled that the five percent raise separately funded in
section 4(B) of the Appropriations Act was never vetoed and therefore
survived intact.103 In so doing, the court struggled over whether, or to what
extent, it was bound by, or was abandoning its earlier declarations relating
to the necessity that connected vetoes stand or fall together.
The Cisneros court’s analysis began with the re-articulation of two
settled principles from prior cases—that the item veto is “‘not a positive
power’” but only a “‘negative power, or a power to delete or destroy;’”104
and that it must “‘destroy[] the whole of an item or part [without]
distort[ing] the legislative intent.’”105 The court then made an unexpected
98. See id. ¶ 3, 340 P.3d at 598–99.
99. The bill also affected sitting supreme court members, four of whom recused
themselves. Id. ¶ 5, 340 P.3d at 599. However, under the so-called “rule of necessity,” the
remaining sitting Justice, Richard Bosson, (who did not recuse, but was not standing for
retention in the coming election) was appointed Chief, with the power to preside and
appoint a quartet of retired jurists to sit pro tempore to decide the case. Id.
100. Id. ¶ 4, 340 P.3d at 599.
101. Id. ¶ 24, 340 P.3d at 604. “The Governor took the position that regardless of
what the Legislature’s original intent may have been to make two separate appropriations,
that intention changed or evolved as the Appropriations Act took final form.” Id.
102. Id. ¶ 6, 340 P.3d at 599.
103. Id. This was another case in which the court ruled from the bench, with this later
opinion setting forth its “reasoning in more detail.” Id.; see, e.g., State ex rel. Coll v.
Carruthers, 1988-NMSC-057, ¶ 3, 107 N.M. 439, 759 P.3d 1380, 1383.
104. 2015-NMSC-001 at ¶ 23, 340 P.2d at 603 (citing State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick,
1974-NMSC-059, ¶ 18, 86 N.M 359, 365, 524 P.2d 975, 981).
105. 2015-NMSC-001 at ¶ 23, 340 P.2d at 603 (citing Sego, 1974-NMSC-059 at ¶ 18,
86 N.M. at 365, 524 P.2d at 981; State ex rel. Smith v. Martinez, 2011-NMSC-043, ¶ 8,
150 N.M. 703, 265 P.3d 1276, 1278) (alterations in original).
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shift from its traditional item veto analysis, contending that “[t]hese broad
principles provide only the starting point of our analysis [because] each
situation has come down to the particular facts of a particular
appropriation and a particular veto.”106 The opinion mis-cites the Sego
decision for this proposition,107 which says nothing about the “fact-bound”
nature of the inquiry or its importance. The Coll decision does, but only
in reference to the need for the court to engage in a “subjective evaluation
of the facts” in striking the balance between legislative and executive
authority through the application of the Sego/Coll principles.108
Nonetheless, this refocus allowed the Cisneros per curium to
construct its search for legislative intent with respect to judicial salaries as a
“factual” matter—whether the legislature intended a combined eight
percent raise or two separate raises of three percent and five percent.109
Finding some ambiguity on that question in the words of the statute, the
court relied on the “‘structure of the statute.’”110 Namely, the court noted
“the Legislature’s own choice to fund these raises through two separate
appropriations, contained in two separate sections of the Appropriations
Act, and made to two separate branches of government—5% to the
Judiciary and 3% to [Department of Finance and Administration].”111 Once
that “factual” issue was resolved, it was easy for the court to conclude that
“the Legislature intended two separate raises . . . one of which the
Governor vetoed, the other of which remained intact.”112
The court found that “the Legislature intended the money allocated
in Section 8(A)(2) to fund the same 3% raise for judges that was given to
other state employees in Section 8(A) . . . . [and] . . . the Governor’s veto
removed from the Appropriations Act every trace of the 3% raise for
judges.”113 This led inexorably to the conclusion that “[e]verything related
to the 3% raise for judges was confined to Section 8(A)(2), which the
Governor vetoed in its entirety.”114
The court recognized, however, that the “closer question is whether
the veto of Section 8(A)(2) had any effect on the 5% raise funded in

106. Id. ¶ 23, 340 P.2d at 603 (emphasis added).
107. Sego, 1974-NMSC-059 at ¶ 11, 86 N.M. at 365, 524 P.2d at 981.
108. Coll, 1988-NMSC-057, ¶ 12, 107 N.M. at 443, 759 P.2d at 1384.
109. Cisneros, 2015-NMSC-001 at ¶ 23–26, 340 P.3d at 603–04.
110. Id. ¶ 25, 340 P.3d at 604 (citing State v. Almanzar, 2014-NMSC-001, ¶ 15, 316
P.3d 183, 186).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. ¶ 27, 340 P.3d at 604.
114. Id.
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Section 4(B).”115 This is especially clear given the governor’s argument that
“the money appropriated in Section 4(B) to fund the 5% raise cannot be
used for its intended purpose because her veto eliminated all of the
‘language’ in the Appropriations Act related to a judicial salary increase.”116
The governor cited language in Stewart to suggest that her argument met
the requirement.117 The court rejected the governor’s argument, however,
claiming it “overlooks the distinct facts of this case,” whereby section 4(B)
“gave judges a 5% raise through [an] appropriation[]. . . without any ‘pay
raise language’ to veto but the appropriations themselves.”118 The court
concluded that “the general rule articulated in Stewart that ‘[a]ll language
that relates to the subject to be proscribed by the veto must be vetoed for
the veto to be valid’ simply does not apply.”119
The court was then confronted with the governor’s further argument
that “if the veto of Section 8(A)(2) did not also eliminate the 5% raise in
Section 4(B), the entire appropriation in Section 4(B) ‘is improper and
should be stricken’ due to ‘careful drafting of legislation’ aimed at
‘circumvent[ing] or preempt[ing] the Governor’s veto power,’” as
established in Sego.120 This time, rather than suggesting that the specific
facts overrode the Sego dictum, the court contended it was not until Coll
that the court was confronted with applying the Sego limitation on
legislative drafting.121 This remains the only instance in which the court has
“rejected a challenge to a partial veto based . . . on a refusal to validate
‘artful drafting’ by the Legislature.”122
Rather than making any factual distinction from the application in
Coll, the court determined the “Legislature imposed no condition . . .
upon its appropriations for judicial pay raises” in its two “stand-alone,
unconditional, and separate appropriations [that] must be vetoed in their
entirety like any other appropriation of which the Governor disapproves in
whole or in part.”123 The court, therefore, rejected the governor’s invitation
“to interpret the notion of ‘subtle drafting’ to fit the circumstances of this
case” because to do so would not provide any “limiting principle to
115. Id. ¶ 28, 340 P.3d at 604.
116. Id. ¶ 354, 340 P.3d at 606.
117. Id. ¶ 34–35, 340 P.3d at 606.
118. Id. ¶ 35, 340 P.3d at 606.
119. Id. (citing State ex rel. Stewart v. Martinez, 2011-NMSC-045, ¶ 15, 270 P.3d 96,
101).
120. Id. ¶ 37, 340 P.3d at 607 (alterations in original); see State ex rel. Sego v.
Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, ¶ 12, 86 N.M 359, 365, 524 P.2d 975, 981.
121. Cisneros, 2015-NMSC-001 at ¶ 38, 340 P.3d at 607.
122. Id.
123. Id. ¶ 39, 340 P.3d at 607.
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distinguish subtle drafting from drafting that is not so subtle.”124 The court
clarified that “[o]utside of the facts of Coll . . . we . . . prefer to allow the
legislative process to play out free from judicial interference.”125 The court
thereby expressed a kind of deference to the political process not
previously found in the item veto cases, and undermined the Coll decision
in the process.
Understanding that it had done some violence to the important
principles of Sego and Coll, the court concluded with a veiled mea culpa,126
suggesting it could not “find any legal basis to conclude” the existence of
legislative overreach, particularly “when the Governor had notice of the
Legislature’s intent and when she had other tools in the political process at
her disposal.”127 Besides, the court continued, this case had arisen in an
“unusual context . . . unlike any of our precedents.”128
Thus, the post-Sego/Coll cases provided useful application of the
previously established principles that governed item veto litigation, until
Cisneros and its per curium effort to resolve the dispute over dual judicial
raises in the 2014 General Appropriation Act. In upholding one of the
raises and allowing the item veto of the other, the New Mexico Supreme
Court came to a reasonable compromise. However, it did so in a way that
may allow future cases to avoid application of the Sego/Coll principles
when confronted with an “unusual circumstance” or where it can be
suggested that the governor has “other tools in the political process at [his
or] her disposal.

D. The Inevitable Invitation for Judicial Restraint
Despite the steady stream of item veto cases in New Mexico,
especially during recent periods of politically-divided government,129 the
New Mexico Supreme Court also has recognized that judicial activism in
124. Id. ¶ 42, 340 P.3d at 608 (citing Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013NMSC-040, ¶ 70, 309 P.3d 53, 75).
125. Id.
126. See id. ¶ 46, 340 P.3d at 609.
127. Id. (emphasis added.) The court detailed numerous opportunities, outside the
resolution of item-veto disputes, for the governor and legislature to work together in the
formulation of legislation—opportunities that always exist and could be used in future cases
to prevent judicial challenges. Id. ¶¶ 12–18, 340 P.3d at 601–02.
128. Id. ¶ 47, 340 P.3d at 609.
129. It should not be surprising that during the same period of divided government,
redistricting efforts requiring a new statute with gubernatorial consent could not be resolved
without judicial involvement. See, e.g., Maestas v. Hall, 2012-NMSC-006, ¶ 45, 274 P.3d
66, 81 (court-drawn redistricting remanded for the second time to correct, among other
things, “the partisan performance changes and bias noted in this order . . . .”).
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this area is not always necessary—or the best policy. Even when the issues
may appear critically important, judicial declination to proceed may arise
when other possible paths to resolution present themselves. Given that
most item veto cases are brought as original mandamus actions in the New
Mexico Supreme Court,130 the court may easily fall back on the principle to
refuse to hear a case because the petitioner failed to demonstrate an
absence of a “plain, speedy and adequate remedy.”131
One recent example can be found in State ex. rel. Stewart v.
Martinez,132 when the court initially refused to hear the case because the
governor intended to include the issue for consideration in a previously
called special session, noting:
Because the special session took place before the effective date
of the language vetoed by Governor Martinez, addressing the
issue during the special session would have been a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that was
available to Petitioners; therefore, a writ of mandamus was not
warranted.133
“When no resolution was reached on the issue during the 2011
Special Session” and “[p]etitioners asserted that their petition was ripe,”
the New Mexico Supreme Court then took the case back for resolution on
the merits.134
Even more critical, however, was a case brought in 2017 that
evidenced just how pitched the battle between the executive and the
legislature may become. In State ex rel. the Legislative Council v.
Martinez,135 there was a challenge to a broad exercise of the line-item veto
of the General Appropriation Act of 2017. First, the governor exercised
the item veto authority to strike all items dealing with the funding of the
state legislature, stating the following justification:
Throughout this legislative session, and others, I have heard a
great deal of discussion about how the Legislative and Judicial
130. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-2-3 (1978) (exclusive original mandamus jurisdiction
in the district and supreme courts); see also supra text accompanying note 43.
131. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-2-5 (1978) (“The writ shall not issue in any case
where there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”).
132. 2011-NMSC-045, 270 P.3d 96, discussed previously at supra text accompanying
note 84.
133. Id. ¶ 8, 270 P.3d at 99 (citing State ex rel. Coll v. Johnson, 1999–NMSC–036, ¶
12, 128 N.M. 154, 158, 990 P.2d 1277, 1281).
134. Id. ¶ 9, 270 P.3d at 100.
135. Petitioner’s Reply in Support of Petition for Emergency Writ of Mandamus, State
ex rel. The Legislative Council v. Martinez, No. S-1-SC-326422 (N.M. May 10, 2017),
https://perma.cc/V3VV-3L9F.
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branches are separate but co-equal branches of government.
While true, it apparently does not apply when they are
considering reductions to their budgets. Every time the
Legislature imposes across-the-board reductions, the Legislature
exempts both itself and the Judiciary from the same level of
reductions that most of our agencies face.136
The governor’s veto message also contended that the legislature’s
appropriations, like those for the district courts, are done in a “lump sum”
fashion, while the executive agencies are appropriated by specific
categories. She claimed this treatment of the legislature and the court does
not lend itself to ensuring “accountability through the effective allocation
of resources for the benefit of all New Mexicans,” as the Legislative
Finance Committee’s mission statement states.137 One might question
whether the governor’s statement in returning the bill to the House
represents a fair expression of the principle of separation of powers with
respect to the three equal branches of government,138 or perhaps a failure
136. The governor’s veto message does not acknowledge that the total appropriation
for the legislature represents only 0.3 percent of the state annual budget or that the
appropriation for the entire statewide judiciary represents only 4.5 percent of the state
annual budget. See Verified Emergency Petition for Original Writ of Mandamus at 5, No.
S-1-SC-36422 (N.M. Apr. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/B2G4-P7GB.
137. N.M. OFFICE OF GOVERNOR, H. Exec. MESSAGE NO. 56, at 2 (Apr. 7, 2017),
https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/17%20Regular/ExecMessages/house/HB0002GovMsg.p
df [https://perma.cc/WWW8-KUBC]. The specific comments by the governor
demonstrate her equal displeasure with the way legislative budget proposals have also
exempted the judiciary from across-the-board cuts, and the “lump sum” funding of district
courts. Thus, it would have been obvious that any ruling in favor of the legislature in a
potential law suit over this wholesale item veto implicating legislative authority might also
have benefited the supreme court’s own budget formulation authority for the judiciary. Id.
138. Judicial review of item vetoes may not extend to an evaluation of the governor’s
“statement of reasons.” As the Colorado Court has cogently explained: “[W]e are mindful
of the fact that the governor may veto a bill for any reason he chooses . . . and this court
will not inquire into the governor’s justifications for a veto.” Romer v. Colo. Gen.
Assembly, 840 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Colo. 1992) (citations omitted); see also Ninetieth Minn.
State Senate v. Dayton, 903 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Minn. 2017) (“We do not ‘judge the
wisdom of a veto, or the motives behind it . . . .’”) (citations omitted). But see Cannabis
Action Coal. v. City of Kent, 322 P.3d 1246, 1253 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 351 P.3d
151 (Wash. 2015) (treating governor’s veto message that accompanied his line-item veto as
legislative intent because governor is acting in legislative capacity when approving or
disapproving legislation).
The Romer court went on to hold that where the state constitution requires that that
bill be filed “with his objections,” a mere statement of the governor’s disapproval is not
sufficient.
As the defendants acknowledged during oral argument, the statements “it’s
unfair,” or “it’s against the public interest” would undoubtedly pass

2019]

SEPARATION OF POWERS IN NEW MEXICO

449

of necessary executive sensitivity to the budgetary needs of the other two
branches.139
The governor also exercised the line-item veto on the 2017 General
Appropriation Act to eliminate the funding for all institutions and entities
involved in higher education. This included items that spanned twentyeight pages of the Act, with the following brief comment:
The Senate refused to hold a hearing for nominated Regents for
several higher education institutions. This is a clear violation of
its constitutional duty. When the Senate appropriated three
quarters of a billion dollars to these institutions, it also took the
unprecedented step of refusing to hold a hearing for those
responsible for the oversight of the appropriated public dollars.
Both the funding for our higher education institutions and the
confirmation of well-qualified regents can be addressed in the
upcoming special session.140
The governor signed the bill on April 7, which included the item
vetoes of entire budget categories for the legislature and all institutions of
higher education. An Emergency Petition for Original Writ of Mandamus
challenging the vetoes of the legislative line-items and the higher education
line-items was filed on April 21, 2017, alleging in its “Summary of the
Bases for the Writ” as follows:
The undue encroachment by one co-equal branch of
government upon another, through the imposition of
constitutional scrutiny as “objections.” Unlike “disapproved” these statements
convey the reasons for disapproval; the sufficiency, rationality, or validity of
which we will not question. “To disallow a veto for the complete absence of
reasons is to establish an objective standard—one with which meddlesome
courts cannot tamper. To disallow a veto because the Governor’s reasons are
not ‘sufficient’ establishes a subjective standard that invites limitless mischief.”
Romer, 840 P.2d at 1084–85 (citation omitted). The New Mexico Supreme Court recently
followed this line of reasoning in affirming a district court judgment in another veto
challenge by the legislature to ten bills returned to the house of origin by the governor
without a statement of objections. See Order at 2, State ex rel. Legislative Council v.
Martinez, No. S-1-SC-36731 (N.M. Apr. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/HSP2-CH8H. The
court, in its Order of affirmance, ruled: “Article IV, § 22 of the New Mexico Constitutions
requires that objections must accompany a returned bill . . . [and] . . . because the
Governor’s objections did not accompany the returned bills at issue in this case, the bills
became law three days after they were presented to the Governor for approval.” Id.
139. Out of respect for the co-equal branches, Hawaii’s Constitution allows for item
vetoes, “[e]xcept for items appropriated to be expended by the judicial and legislative
branches.” HAW. CONST. art. III, § 16.
140. N.M. OFFICE OF GOVERNOR, supra note 137, at 7. Although the governor
mentions an “upcoming special session,” no proclamation for calling one had yet been
issued. See N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
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improvident vetoes which attempt to eviscerate the ability of the
other branch to perform its essential functions, violates the
essence of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
In the present circumstances, the challenged line-item vetoes,
which purported to remove all funding for the Legislative
Branch, violate the doctrine of separation of powers and also
are in derogation of Article IV of the New Mexico Constitution,
which obligates the Legislature to fund the expenses of the
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches.
The Constitution also prohibits the wholesale defunding,
through a purported line-item veto, of our constitutionallyenabled and statutorily-authorized institutions of higher
education and other constitutionally-created departments,
agencies, and state government institutions. As amplified below,
a Writ of Mandamus is necessary and appropriate to invalidate
the challenged vetoes and to restore the funding set forth in the
General Appropriation Act.141
Thus, the petition was primarily based on the claim that the governor
could not use the item veto to eliminate all funding for the co-equal
branches of government or the constitutionally created institutions of
higher education.
Three days later, the court requested a response, invited amicus
participation from the New Mexico Council of University Presidents,142
and set the matter for oral argument on May 15, 2017.143 On the day that
the Governor’s Response and the Presidents’ Amicus Brief144 were filed,
the governor issued a proclamation calling the legislature into special
141. Verified Emergency Petition for Original Writ of Mandamus at 1–2, State ex rel.
The New Mexico Legislative Council v. Martinez, No. S-1-SC-36422 (N.M. Apr. 21, 2017)
(emphasis in original), https://perma.cc/B2G4-P7GB.
142. This invitation was not surprising because the Petition built an argument based on
a letter from the President of the New Mexico Council of University Presidents to
Governor Martinez objecting to the vetoes of funding for public colleges and universities.
See id. at 7.
143. Order at 2, State ex rel. Legislative Council v. Martinez, No. S-1-SC-36422 (N.M.
Apr. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/Y4GS-GYER.
144. Perhaps most telling and politically powerful were the portions of the Presidents’
amicus curiae brief making note of the particularly critical and time sensitive concerns of
the colleges and universities and the entities under their control. That brief argued the
following three points: The threat to public health in New Mexico; the disruption of
recruitment and retention of students, faculty and medical staff; and the acute budget
uncertainty that has caused other problems for higher education. See Brief of the N.M.
Council of Univ. Presidents as Amicus Curiae at 19, State ex rel. the Legislative Council v.
Martinez, No. S-1-SC-36422 (N.M. May 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/2YL7-RKKF.
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session on May 24 to address the funding issues raised in the Petition.145
Three days before the hearing on the Petition was to take place, the court
issued an Order reciting the foregoing procedural history and ordered
“that the petition for writ of mandamus is DENIED AS NOT RIPE FOR
REVIEW.”146
The legislature met on May 24 and re-passed the previous
appropriations to the legislature and the colleges. The bill, named the
Supplemental General Appropriation Act of 2017, was signed into law by
the governor on May 26.147 The bill avoided any further involvement by
the court, beyond its previous orders calling for publicly filed briefs and its
order stepping aside to allow for a necessary political resolution during the
special session, which ultimately facilitated the resolution of the crisis.
By doing so, the court avoided what otherwise would have been a
constitutional crisis of grave and enormous proportions, no matter how it
might have been resolved. If the planned veto eliminating all funding for
the legislature had survived, it would have prevented the legislature from
conducting its important interim activities between sessions. The veto,
therefore, also would have impeded the ability of the legislature to
function during the next scheduled regular session by eliminating all
funding for legislators and legislative staff. Such a result would prevent one
of the three co-equal branches from undertaking its constitutional
functions, including its important checks-and-balances review over the
145. The Governor’s proclamation lists as the first “object” for which the session was
called “[a] general appropriation act that provides specific funding for legislative agencies
and institutions of higher education.” See Response to Verified Petition for Original Writ
of Mandamus at Ex. A, State ex rel. the Legislative Council v. Martinez, No. S-1-SC-36422
(N.M. May 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/6AZM-2K82.
146. Order at 2, State ex rel. Legislative Council v. Martinez, No. S-1-SC-36422 (N.M.
May 11, 2017) (formatting in original), https://perma.cc/89YQ-MV6Z. The Legislative
Council difficulty in New Mexico was taking place almost simultaneously with the even
more complex difficulty surrounding the Minnesota item veto experience in Ninetieth
Minn. State Senate v. Dayton, 903 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 2017).
Ninetieth Minn. State Senate involved a dispute over a tax bill that the governor allowed to
pass as a temporary measure, but not without his veto of the appropriations for both the
House and Senate, to lure the legislative leadership back to the bargaining table. Id. at 614.
The Ninetieth Minn. State Senate court concluded that “the line-item vetoes did not violate
Article III by effectively abolishing the Legislature,” but exercised “restraint on the
coercion aspect of the Article III issue,” out of regard for the power of the parties “to
resolve political disputes that arise in the course of . . . [the legislative] process,” and
because “the Legislature has access to the funding it says it needs to continue its legislative
functions until it reconvenes in the next regular session.” Id. at 612–13. As a result, the
Ninetieth Minn. State Senate court remanded the case to the district court for entry of
dismissal. Id.
147. See H. B. 1, 53d Leg., Spec. Sess. (N.M. 2017).
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broad ranging activities of the executive branch of government that are a
part of its legislative function.148
On the other hand, if the court had ordered that the wholesale
elimination of the funding was unconstitutional, it would have undermined
the joint budget making function of the political branches.149 Courts are
disinclined to conclude that the legislature can make its own demands on
the treasury until such times as the political branches can agree on a
budget.150
The same concerns apply with respect to the wholesale veto of all
higher education funding. Even though the state institutions of higher
education are not “co-equal” branches of government, seven of the
colleges and universities, as well as other educational and related
institutions, have specific constitutional status.151 This status should perhaps
afford them constitutional protection from the gubernatorial power to
eliminate all of their funding, which would put them out of business for a
148.

Prior New Mexico cases had not dealt with the extreme situation presented in

Legislative Council, but there were suggestions in prior cases supporting this position. See,
e.g., Thomson v. Legislative Audit Comm’n, 1968-NMSC-184, ¶¶ 16–17, 79 N.M. 693,
697, 448 P.2d 799, 803 (stating that the legislature could not abolish the constitutionally
established office of State Auditor, by taking away its fundamental functions or not properly
funding the office); State ex rel. Prater v. State Bd. of Fin., 1955-NMSC-013, ¶ 11, 59 N.M.
121, 127–28, 279 P.2d 1042, 1046 (declaring that were the appropriations of the Barbers’
Board so reduced “as to put it out of business as effectively as if repealed,” it would violate
the constraining influence of N.M Const. art. IV, § 16 which mandates that a GAA shall
embrace funding of the three branches of government). See also State ex rel. Nunez v.
Baynard, 15 So. 2d 649, 659 (La. Ct. App. 1943) (holding that with respect to salaries of
positions created in the constitution the legislature is bound to appropriate the funds to pay
them, and the governor’s veto of these appropriations “was unconstitutional, null and
void”).
149. See Ninetieth Minn. State Senate, 903 N.W.2d at 612–13 (exercising restraint on
one aspect of the constitutional challenge to the item veto of the legislative appropriation
out of regard for the power of the parties “to resolve political disputes that arise in the
course of [the legislative] process”).
150. In Ninetieth Minn. State Senate, however, both the Governor and the legislature
stipulated that courts could order temporary funding for the legislature while the issue was
resolved. 903 N.W.2d at 615. See also State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 207 S.E.2d
421, 431 (W. Va. 1973) (“We adhere to the maxim that the judiciary department possesses
the inherent power to determine its needs and to obtain the funds necessary to fulfill such
needs.”).
151. See N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 11 (establishing the constitutional basis of the
following institutions: The University of New Mexico, New Mexico State University, New
Mexico Highlands University, Western New Mexico University, Eastern New Mexico
University, New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology; as well as the New Mexico
Military Institute, New Mexico School for the Blind and Visually Impaired, New Mexico
School for the Deaf, and Northern New Mexico State School).
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large part of an academic year. And, as argued in the University
Presidents’ Brief, even the threat that funding might cease in a few months
may have catastrophic implications for each institution of higher
education.152
With regard to the institutions of higher education, the governor’s
position might be strengthened by the fact that, however viewed, the
colleges and university are not equal branches, and in any case, they
perform largely executive functions overseen by the Higher Education
Department.153 The Secretary of the Higher Education Department is a
member of the governor’s cabinet, and that authority coupled with the role
that the governor plays in university oversight through the appointment of
the board of regent, suggests a level of executive control not afforded with
respect to the legislature or the courts.154
The range and complexity of these arguments demonstrate that
judicial restraint may, in some instances, be an appropriate choice,
especially if other paths toward resolution are on the horizon. In this case,
by allowing the filing of the Petition, requiring full briefing of the parties
(including the university presidents), setting the case for an expeditious
oral argument, and only then deciding not to hear the case on “ripeness”
grounds, the court may have done everyone a favor. It thereby allowed for
the political branches to honor their responsibilities and demonstrated that
the power of the judiciary can sometimes be measured as much by what it
does not do, as by what it does do.
IV. EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLES OVER SETTING STATE
POLICY
The item veto tug of war between the legislature and the governor,
reviewed in the prior section, was often resolved by the court’s application
of a highly functional approach. As noted earlier, formalism would not
work well where both branches were relying on the conference of
legislative power to each under article IV, section 22 of the state
constitution.155 Thus, in resolving item veto cases, the court has often based
its decision on whether manipulative drafting by the legislature
overstepped the line into micromanaging the execution of the law or,

152.

Brief of the N.M. Council of Univ. Presidents as Amicus Curiae at 9–18, State ex.

rel. the Legislative Council v. Martinez, No. S-1-SC-36422 (N.M. May 5, 2017).
153. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 9-25-1 et seq. (1978).
154. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 9-25-4 (1978).
155. For earlier discussions of formalism and functionalism in this context, see supra,
notes 15–17 and 61–62.
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alternatively, whether the governor’s veto improperly interfered with the
legislative prerogative of fashioning state law.156
Non-item veto struggles generally involve standalone actions by either
the executive or the legislature.157 When such claims are made in New
Mexico, the courts invoke the express separation-of-powers provision in
the constitution.158 Those cases are more fundamentally based on the
separate constitutional articles that define the powers of each, and the
claim that the exercise of the power of one branch either exceeds the
power granted to it, or encroaches on the constitutional power of the other
branch.
We turn now to case examples to further understand how separationof-powers operates in state constitutional law by examining two non-item
veto matters that were brought as original actions in the New Mexico
Supreme Court.159 These cases involved issues regarding which branch had
the primary responsibility to exercise state authority over Indian gaming
and welfare reform.160 Both cases raised federalism concerns because they
also involved the exercise of state power under federal law.

A.

The Indian Gaming Dispute

In State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson,161 the Governor of New Mexico
attempted to enter into contracts with various Indian tribes to permit
Indian Gaming Enterprises on tribal lands in compliance with the Federal
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).162 IGRA does not mandate state
authorization of tribal gaming, but requires authorization with respect to

156. State ex. rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, ¶ 12, 86 N.M. 359, 364, 524
P.2d 975, 980 (holding that “[t]he Legislature may not properly abridge [the Governor’s
veto] power by subtle drafting of conditions, limitations or restrictions upon appropriations,
and the Governor may not properly distort legislative appropriations or arrogate unto
himself the power of making appropriations by carefully striking words, phrases or
sentences from an item or part of an appropriation.”).
157. See Winston David Holliday, Jr., Comment, Tipping the Balance of Power: A
Critical Survey of the Gubernatorial Line Item Veto, 50 S.C. L. REV. 503 (1999).
158. That clause provides: “no person or collection of persons charged with the
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution otherwise
expressly directed or permitted.” N.M. CONST. art. III, § 1.
159. State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 1995-NMSC-048, 120 N.M. 562, 904 P.2d 11;
State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1998-NMSC-015, 125 N.M. 343, 961 P.2d 768.
160. Clark, 1995-NMSC-048, ¶¶ 1–2, 120 N.M. at 566, 904 P.2d at 15; Taylor, 1998NMSC-015, ¶ 2, 125 N.M. at 346, 961 P.2d at 771.
161. 1995-NMSC-048, 120 N.M. 562, 904 P.2d 11.
162. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (1995).
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general, casino-like gaming (classified by IGRA as Class III gaming).163
Federal law provides that such gaming “is lawful on Indian lands only if
such activities are located in a state that ‘permits such gaming for any
purpose by any person organization or entity, and [is] conducted in
conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe
and the State.’”164 While the outgoing governor had refused to undertake
negotiations with respect to Class III gaming, Governor-elect Gary
Johnson appointed a negotiator who agreed to compacts and revenuesharing agreements with several tribes. Governor Johnson signed these
compacts soon after taking office.165
A petition was filed thereafter, claiming that the governor “lacked the
authority to commit New Mexico to these compacts and agreements,
because he attempted to exercise legislative authority contrary to the
doctrine of separation of powers expressed in the state Constitution.”166 In
resolving the case, the New Mexico Supreme Court first reviewed its prior
commitment to separation-of-powers as “fundamental in the structure of
the federal government and the governments of all fifty states.”167 The
court noted that the doctrine “‘allows some overlap in the exercise of
governmental function.’”168 The court then asserted its necessary but
reluctant intervention “when one branch of government unduly
‘interfere[d] with or encroach[ed] on the authority or within the province

163. The brief history leading to the adoption of IGRA, the three classes of gaming the
Act deals with, and the federal-state relationship in enforcing its provisions, is briefly
described in Clark, 1995-NMSC-048, ¶¶ 3–4, 120 N.M. at 566, 904 P.2d at 15.
164. Id. ¶ 4, 120 N.M. at 566, 904 P.2d at 15 (quoting 25 U.S.C.S. § 2710(d)(1))
(alteration in original).
165. Id. ¶ 8, 120 N.M. at 567, 904 P.2d at 16.
166. Id. ¶ 2, 120 N.M. at 566, 904 P.2d at 15 (citing N.M. CONST. art. III. § 1; State
ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1992)). Before turning to the separation of
powers issue, the court addressed a number of preliminary issues. Borrowing from part of
the seminal State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975
decision dealing with related matters, the Clark court ruled that the original mandamus
petition was properly brought; that a mandamus action may extend to both affirmative and
prohibitory relief; that the tribes were not indispensable parties; and finally, that an
expansive construction of state law seems to authorize other organizations in the state to
engage in “casino-style” gaming, thereby triggering the applicability of IGRA’s directions
with respect to Class III gaming, but in any event, the governor has taken a course contrary
to the legislatures “expressed . . . public policy against unrestricted gaming.” Clark, 1995NMSC-048 at ¶¶ 14–30, 120 N.M. at 568–72, 904 P.2d at 17–21.
167. Id. ¶ 31, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22.
168. Id. ¶ 32, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22 (quoting Mowrer v. Rusk, 1980-NMSC
113, ¶ 25, 95 N.M. 48, 54, 618 P.2d 886, 892).
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of’ a coordinate branch of government.”169 The court first articulated its
task in markedly formalistic terms:
If the entry into the compacts reasonably can be viewed as the
execution of law, we would have no difficulty recognizing the
attempt as within the Governor’s authority as the State’s chief
executive officer. If, on the other hand, his actions in fact
conflict with or infringe upon what is the essence of legislative
authority—the making of law—then the Governor has exceeded
his authority.170
The court then concluded: “We have no doubt that the compact . . .
does not execute existing New Mexico statutory or case law, but that it is
instead an attempt to create new law.”171
Not satisfied to end the matter there under its apparent formalistic
approach, the court, citing Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,172
made clear that it would apply its test to determine “whether the
Governor’s action disrupts the proper balance between the executive and
legislative branches.”173 This functional turn allowed the court to list and
rely upon a number of ways in which the governor’s action worked as an
“undue disruption of legislative authority.” Those included:
[a.] The Governor’s present authority could not preclude future
legislative action, and he could not execute an agreement that
foreclosed inconsistent legislative action or precluded the
application of such legislation to the agreement. The compact . .
. cannot be said to be consistent with these principles [because]
[t]he terms of the compact . . . give the Tribe a virtually
irrevocable and seemingly perpetual right to conduct any form
of Class III gaming permitted in New Mexico on the date the
Governor signed the agreement.174
169. Id. ¶ 32, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22 (quoting Mowrer, 1980-NMSC 113 at ¶
28, 95 N.M. at 54, 618 P.2d at 892). Mowrer also held, inter alia, that “any statute, which
requires that the judiciary first submit its requested budget to the mayor or any part of the
executive branch of government prior to submitting the same to the legislative branch of
government is unconstitutional as violative of Article III of the Constitution of New
Mexico.” Mowrer, 1980-NMSC 113 at ¶ 6, 95 N.M. at 50–51, 618 P.2d at 888–89. It is
prior holdings like Mowrer that bolster the suggestion that if State ex rel. Smith v. Martinez,
2011-NMSC-043, 150 N.M. 703, 265 P.3d 1276 had been litigated to conclusion in favor
of the legislature, it might have had broad implications by limiting executive line-item
authority over judicial appropriations.
170. Clark, 1995-NMSC-048, ¶ 33, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22.
171. Id. ¶ 34, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22.
172. 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
173. Clark, 1995-NMSC-048, ¶ 34, 120 N.M. at 574, 904 P.2d at 23.
174. Id. ¶¶ 34–35, 120 N.M. at 574, 904 P.2d at 23.
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[b.] While the legislature might authorize the Governor to enter
into a gaming compact or ratify his actions with respect to a
compact he has negotiated, the Governor cannot enter into such
a compact solely on his own authority.175
[c.] Whether or not the legislature, if given an opportunity to
address the issue of the various gaming compacts, would favor a
more restrictive approach consistent with its actions in the past
constitutes a legislative policy decision. . . . By entering into such
a permissive compact[,] . . . the Governor contravened the
legislature’s expressed aversion to commercial gambling and
exceeded his authority as this State’s chief executive officer.176
The court faced a federal preemption-based argument made by the
governor, who claimed that “even if he lacked authority under state law to
enter into the compact, it is nonetheless binding upon the State . . . as a
matter of federal law,” and that regardless of whether he has such authority
as a matter of state law, “he possesses the authority, as a matter of federal
law. . . .”177 Both claims were summarily rejected by the court because
“[t]he Governor has only such authority as is given to him by our state
constitution and statutes enacted pursuant to it.”178 The court did not
believe that Congress “sought to invest state governors with powers in
excess of those that the governors possess under state law.”179 Finally,
recognizing that the Federal Congress could enact legislation “legalizing all
forms of gambling on all Indian lands,” the court emphasized that rather
than doing that, IGRA “sought to give the states a role in the process” by
authorizing state officials, “acting pursuant to their authority held under
state law, to enter into gaming compacts on behalf of the state.”180
Clark came at the end of an understandable political battle between
one party, whose governor opposed the infusion of generalized casino
175. Id. ¶ 36, 120 N.M. at 574, 904 P.2d at 23.
176. Id. ¶ 37, 120 N.M. at 575, 904 P.2d at 24 (emphasis added). Having resolved the
constitutional separation of powers issue, the court also rejected gubernatorial claims that
the Governor’s actions were authorized under two state statutes. See id. ¶¶ 41–43, 120
N.M. at 576–77, 904 P.2d at 25–26.
177. Id. ¶ 44, 120 N.M. at 577, 904 P.2d at 26 (emphasis in original). In reciting the
facts of the case, the court mentioned that the Governor’s compacts had been approved by
the Secretary of Interior, but no federal preemption argument on that basis seems to have
been made, although the Governor presented such an argument in the welfare case which
is next treated in this section. Id. ¶ 8, 120 N.M. at 567, 904 P.2d at 16.
178. Id. ¶ 44, 120 N.M. at 577, 904 P.2d at 26.
179. Id.
180. Id. ¶ 45, 120 N.M. at 577, 904 P.2d at 26 (emphasis added).
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gambling in the state through the IGRA process, and the opposing party,
whose gubernatorial candidate endorsed such infusion and won the next
election. Clark, however, forced the issue of Indian gaming back into the
legislative arena, where the issue necessarily became not whether there
would be Indian gaming, but rather in what form and under what
regulatory regime.181 In the process, the court was able, rather easily, to
conclude that the matter of compacting with the Indian tribes involved so
many issues of state policy that the legislative’s role must be primary.182

B.

The Welfare Litigation

The New Mexico Supreme Court seemed to speak clearly on the
matter in Clark. Nevertheless, a similar executive and legislative struggle
had to play out again regarding the extensive changes in the essential
federal-state partnership to create and carry out a cornerstone program of
the Social Security system dealing with the care of the needy. In State ex
rel. Taylor v. Johnson,183 the governor engaged in a replay of the script he
tried to administer in Clark—exercising his executive authority to create a
new welfare program in the wake of a new federal welfare statute. This
time, however, the executive action came after the state legislature had
adopted a new state statutory regime in compliance with the federal law
that the governor vetoed.184
As explained in Taylor, the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program (AFDC) was adopted as part of the Social Security Act
of 1935 and created “a new federal-state public assistance partnership” in
which the federal government “established the primary framework for
public assistance programs and offered funding for states that
implemented their programs.”185 New Mexico signed on in 1937 with the
adoption of the Public Assistance Act (NMPAA), allowing the state to
participate in the federal program and obtain significant federal funds for
the benefit of its needy population.186 That partnership between the federal
and state governments continued over several decades with a number of
adjustments and additions.187 A major change, however, occurred with the
passage of the Federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
181. Id. ¶ 42–43, 120 N.M. at 576–77, 904 P.2d at 25–26.
182. Id. ¶ 47, 120 N.M. at 577–78, P.2d 26–27.
183. 1998-NMSC-015, 125 N.M. 343, 961 P.2d 768.
184. Id. ¶¶ 6–12, 125 N.M. at 346–47, 961 P.2d at 771–72.
185. Id. ¶ 6, 125 N.M. at 346, 961 P.2d at 771.
186. Id. ¶ 7, 125 N.M. at 346–47, 961 P.2d at 771–72.
187. Id. ¶ 8, 125 N.M. at 347, 961 P.2d at 772 (including the addition of the food
stamp and medical assistance programs).
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Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRA).188 The PRA repealed several constraints
on the states, gave them greater flexibility, and replaced the AFDC
structure with a block-grant program called Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF). In anticipation of the impending federal law, the
governor submitted his proposal to the state legislature, which failed to
gain legislative approval and presaged a political fight not unlike the fight
over the state’s role in Indian gaming.189
After the Federal PRA became law, the New Mexico Legislature
responded with the passage of its own Family Assistance and Individual
Responsibility Act (FAIR) to accommodate TANF requirements and
provide authorization to the New Mexico Human Services Department
(HSD) to administer the program.190 The governor vetoed the FAIR bill
and item vetoed the funds for it in the General Appropriation Act. In his
veto message, the governor stated that “he possessed authority to exercise
the discretion left to the states under the [federal] PRA [arguing] that the
proposed state legislation encroached upon the executive’s authority.”191
He then announced the creation of his own public assistance reform
program labeled “PROGRESS,” which HSD sought to implement
through its regulatory process.192 The instant action was then brought
seeking a writ of mandamus to enjoin the governor’s program.193
After briefing and oral argument by the parties, the court ruled from
the bench against the governor’s exercise of executive authority because it
was an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers. The court
ordered the respondents to:
a) desist from the implementation of their PROGRESS
program, and b) to administer the Public Assistance Program in
full compliance with New Mexico statutes until such time as
existing law is altered or amended by the passage of a bill by the
state legislature which is then signed into law by the governor in
accordance with the provisions of the New Mexico
Constitution.194
The governor and his HSD Secretary failed to follow that order. This
led to a subsequent hearing that resulted in another order, which held the
respondents in contempt. The issuance of the court’s formal opinion
188.
189.
772.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

42 U.S.C. §§ 601–609 (1997).
State ex rel. Taylor, 1998-NMSC-015 at ¶ ¶ 11–12, 125 N.M. at 347, 961 P.2d at

Id. ¶ 10, 125 N.M. at 347, 961 P.2d at 772.
Id. ¶ 11, 125 N.M. at 347, 961 P.2d at 772.
Id. ¶ 12, 125 N.M. at 347, 961 P.2d at 772.
Id. ¶ 13, 125 N.M. at 347–48, 961 P.2d at 772–73.
Id. ¶ 13 125 N.M. at 348, 961 P.2d at 773.
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followed. The opinion fully elaborated on the court’s separation-of-powers
reasoning underlying its initial ruling, as well as the basis of its contempt
ruling.195
After reviewing the propriety of the mandamus petition in this case,196
the court dealt with the respondents’ arguments, which maintained that:
[A]s agents of the executive branch, they may implement the
policy changes [in the welfare program] without seeking the
direct participation of the Legislature . . . [T]he Legislature
conferred discretionary authority upon HSD to . . . enact all
regulations necessary to secure federal public assistance funds
[and] that New Mexico and federal law compelled them to
make the policy changes.197
The court repeated its discourse from the recent Clark decision on
the importance of separation-of-powers to the structure of government, the
non-absolute nature of the doctrine, and the need for the court to ensure
“‘the proper balance between the executive and legislative branches.’”198
The court went on to elaborate on the application of the Clark balancing
test in the context of this case:
A violation [of the separation of powers] occurs when the
Executive, rather than the Legislature, determines “how, when,
and for what purpose the public funds shall be applied in
carrying on the government . . . ”199 [I]nfringement upon
legislative power may also occur where the executive does not
“execute existing . . . statutory or case law [and rather attempts]
to create new law.”200
Applying the Clark principles here, the court concluded that
“Respondents’ program implement[ed] the type of substantive policy
changes reserved to the Legislature [because] [t]heir changes substantially
altered, modified, and extended existing law governing . . . public
assistance in New Mexico,”201 and attempted “to foreclose legislative action
195. See id. ¶¶ 14–66, 125 N.M. at 348–57, 961 P.2d at 773–82.
196. See id. ¶¶ 14–18, 125 N.M. at 348–49, 961 P.2d at 773–74. The court reiterated
its earlier discussion of mandamus in the cases discussed earlier. See cases cited supra note
160.
197. Taylor, 1998-NMSC-015 at ¶ 19, 125 N.M. at 349, 961 P.2d at 774.
198. Id. ¶ 24, 125 N.M. at 350, 961 P.2d at 775 (quoting State ex rel. Clark v.
Johnson, 1995-NMSC-048, ¶ 34, 120 N.M. 562, 574, 904 P.2d 11, 23.
199. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Schwartz v. Johnson, 1995-NMSC-83, ¶ 14, 120 N.M.
820, 825, 907 P.2d 1001, 1006 (holding that a statute conferring fiscal authority on the
governor did not provide sufficient standards to allow the governor to act contrary to
existing legislative policy choices)).
200. Id. (quoting Clark, 1995-NMSC-048 at ¶ 34, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22).
201. Id. ¶ 25, 125 N.M. at 350, 961 P.2d at 775.
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. . . where legislative authority [wa]s undisputed.”202 That led the court to
expressly hold that “[r]espondents’ program constitute[d] executive
creation of substantive law, and as such, [wa]s an unconstitutional
encroachment upon the Legislature’s role of declaring public policy.”203
The court then bolstered its holding by listing numerous ways in
which the executive plan would work substantive adjustments to public
assistance policy.204 All of which, by their very nature, set fundamental
standards and made vital policy choices—both roles reserved for the
legislature under article IV, section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution.205
These adjustments were consistent with past practices involving public
assistance changes, leading the court to reiterate its conclusion that “[b]y
implementing their plan through HSD regulations rather than through the
required legislative process, Respondents made these core policy choices
themselves, thereby preventing the constitutionally required input of the
people’s elected law-making representatives.”206
The court similarly rejected the governor’s claim that he was
authorized by either state or federal law to act alone in creating his new
public assistance program,207 leading to yet a third restatement of its
holding:
Because the substantive public assistance policy changes
promulgated in Respondents’ plan required legislative
participation and because neither state statute nor federal law
conferred discretionary authority upon Respondents to institute
the policy changes, we conclude that Respondents violated
Article III, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution.208
202. Id. (quoting Clark, 1995-NMSC-048 at ¶ 34, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22).
203. Id. This holding continues the court’s practice of melding formalism (the focus
on the “legislative” nature of the activity), with functionalism (the degree of encroachment
on the function of the other branch), as the operational test for violation of separation of
powers. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
204. The court explained that the executive plan would deny the legislature “any
participation” in the following policy choices: the definition of “dependency” for public
assistance benefits; setting mandatory work requirements that might exceed those required
by federal law; determining whether entitlement to benefits are to be maintained; and the
setting of durational limits. See Taylor, 1998-NMSC-015 at ¶¶ 27–30, 125 N.M. at 350–51,
961 P.2d at 775–76.
205. Id. ¶ 31, 125 N.M. at 351, 961 P.2d at 776.
206. Id. ¶ 33, 125 N.M. at 352, 961 P.2d at 777.
207. Id. ¶¶ 34–48, 125 N.M. at 352–54, 961 P.2d at 777–79.
208. Id. ¶ 49, 125 N.M. at 355, 961 P.2d at 781. The remainder of the opinion dealt
with the need for and content of the court’s further order of indirect civil contempt, and
what was required for the Respondents to be able to purge themselves of that contempt. Id.
¶¶ 50–65, 125 N.M. at 355–57, 961 P.2d at 780–82.
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Thus, Taylor provided an opportunity to apply the clear principles
established in Clark. Given the governor’s brazen disregard of legislative
prerogatives, the court may have purposefully used the case as an
opportunity to reemphasize and elaborate at length on the executive’s lack
of authority to formulate policy without constitutional or legislative
authority. The court did so by listing in detail the number of ways the
governor’s actions either interfered with or foreclosed the essential
legislative role in setting state policy. The court thus left as broad a
precedent on the matter as it could, while also asserting a broad
federalism-based power of the state to exercise the full range of its power
in programs involving cooperative federalism, so long as that authority is
expressed through legislative processes. Finally, to rein in excessive
executive power, the court highlighted its own power to insist on the
sanctity of judicial orders as an important cornerstone of the rule of law.
The warning to future governors on this subject could not have been
clearer.
V. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of separation-of-powers was fraught with practical
difficulties from the beginning. The hope of the Framers of the late
eighteenth century might have been for a constructive tension usually
resolved by a healthy dose of self-restraint on the part of the political
branches when dealing with one another. Nonetheless, with the rise of
political parties, at both the federal and state level, the seeds had been
sewn to allow for what Professor Schlessinger much later described as
“permanent guerrilla warfare,” often requiring judicial intervention to
resolve.209
Similarly, the item veto was initially seen as a “good government”
addition to the constitutions of the states to help check against budgetary
excesses and provide an orderly assistance to balance budgets. But that
device, too—especially when expanded (as in New Mexico) to allow item
veto of more than “items of appropriation”—necessarily leads to
manipulative legislative and gubernatorial struggles over much more than
dollar amounts. The New Mexico experience, however, has some salutary
features that followed from the court’s careful attempt to articulate neutral
principles to guide the judicial evaluation of cases brought to resolve interbranch item veto disputes.
The Sego/Coll principles—articulating the court’s dual policing role to
protect each branch from the damaging interventions of the other—do
209.

See Schlesinger, supra note 24.
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provide guideposts for both executive and legislative actors. Indeed, the
author has personally observed Legislative Counsel Service staff being able
to use those principles in advising the legislative drafting process, and one
can assume that similar advisement takes place in the executive branch
with respect to proposed gubernatorial vetoes. Difficulties, however, will
remain when complex problems arise, like those presented in Stewart and
Cisneros; the latter having created opportunities for future arguments to
avoid the Sego/Coll principles.
Furthermore, special circumstances are always presented when the
courts are confronted with non-item veto, separation-of-powers cases
where the executive tries to take preemptive action to assert executive
authority and diminish or foreclose legislative authority in matters that
require critical decisions concerning state policy. When matters like that
arise, as they did in Clark and Taylor, state courts like ours will be ever
vigilant to protect the essential legislative prerogatives and redress the
proper balance between legislative and executive power.
Finally, another value comes from New Mexico’s extensive judicial
involvement in these matters. An experienced court with a well-developed
separation of power and item veto jurisprudence, and extensive experience
with such matters, can be trusted to delve deeply in these cases when
necessary and also exercise restrain when advisable, not out of timidity, but
from an understanding that on some occasions judicial inaction may be an
effective tool in reaching accommodation.
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APPENDIX A: TABLE OF STATE ITEM VETO PROVISIONS
State Constitution LineItem Veto Provisions210

Allows Veto to
Appropriations
in Appropriation
Bills

Alabama
(Ala. Const. § 126)
(“disapprove any item
or items of any
appropriation bill
embracing distinct
items”)

X

Alaska
(Alaska Const. art. II, §
15) (“strike or reduce
items in appropriation
bills”)211

X

Arizona
(Ariz. Const. art. V, §
7) (“If any bill …
contains several items
of appropriations of
money, he may object
to one or more of such
items”)

X

Arkansas
(Ark. Const. art. VI, §
17) (“disapprove any
item, or items, of any
bill making
appropriation of
money, embracing
distinct items”)

X

Allows Veto of
NonAppropriations in
Appropriation Bills

Allows
Reducing or
Changing
Appropriations

X

210. The following states are not included in this chart, as they have no line-item veto
provision: (1) Indiana; (2) Nevada; (3) New Hampshire; (4) North Carolina; (5) Rhode
Island; and (6) Vermont.
211. In Alaska, line item vetoes overrides require an affirmative vote by three-quarters
of the legislature, instead of only two-thirds for standard vetoes. See Alaska Const. art. II, §
15.
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State Constitution LineItem Veto Provisions212

Allows Veto to
Appropriations
in Appropriation
Bills

California
(Cal. Const. art. IV, §
10) (“reduce or
eliminate one or more
items of
appropriation”)

X

Colorado
(Colo. Const. art. IV, §
12) (“disapprove of any
item or items of any bill
making appropriations
of money, embracing
distinct items”)

X

Connecticut
(Conn. Const. art. IV, §
16) (“disapprove of any
item or items of any bill
making appropriations
of money embracing
distinct”)

X

Delaware
(Del. Const. art. III,
§18) (“disapprove of
any item or items of
any bill making
appropriations of
money, embracing
distinct items”)
Florida
(Fla. Const. art. III, §
8) (“veto any specific
appropriation in a
general appropriation
bill, but may not veto
any qualification or
restriction without also
vetoing the
appropriation to which
it relates”)

Allows Veto of
NonAppropriations in
Appropriation Bills

465

Allows
Reducing or
Changing
Appropriations

X

X

X

212. The following states are not included in this chart, as they have no line-item veto
provision: (1) Indiana; (2) Nevada; (3) New Hampshire; (4) North Carolina; (5) Rhode
Island; and (6) Vermont.
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State Constitution LineItem Veto Provisions213

Allows Veto to
Appropriations
in Appropriation
Bills

Georgia
(Ga. Const. art. III, § 5,
¶ XIII) (“approve any
appropriation and veto
any other
appropriation in the
same bill”)

X

Idaho
(Idaho Const. art. IV, §
11) (“disapprove of any
item or items of any bill
making appropriations
of money embracing
distinct items”)

X

Illinois214
(Ill. Const. art. IV, § 9)
(“reduce or veto any
item of appropriations
in a bill”)

X

Iowa
(Iowa Const. art. III, §
16) (“disapprove any
item of an
appropriation bill”)

X

Kansas
(Kan. Const. art. II, §
14) (“If any bill …
contains several items
of appropriation of
money, one or more of
such items may be
disapproved”)

X

Kentucky
(Ky. Const. § 88)
(“disapprove any part
or parts of
appropriation bills
embracing distinct
items”)

Allows Veto of
NonAppropriations in
Appropriation Bills
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Allows
Reducing or
Changing
Appropriations

X

X

213. The following states are not included in this chart, as they have no line-item veto
provision: (1) Indiana; (2) Nevada; (3) New Hampshire; (4) North Carolina; (5) Rhode
Island; and (6) Vermont.
214. If the governor reduces the amount of a line-item in Illinois, only a majority vote
is required to override this reduction. Ill. Const. art. IV, § 9.
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State Constitution LineItem Veto Provisions215

Louisiana
(La. Const. Ann. art.
IV, § 5) (“veto any line
item in an
appropriation bill”)

Allows Veto to
Appropriations
in Appropriation
Bills

Allows
Reducing or
Changing
Appropriations

X

Maine216
(Me. Const. art. IV, Pt.
3, § 2-A) (“disapprove
any dollar amount
appearing in an
appropriation section
or allocation section, or
both, of an enacted
legislative document . .
. [and] replace the
dollar amount with one
that does not result in
an increase in an
appropriation or
allocation or a decrease
in a deappropriation or
deallocation”)

X

Maryland
(Md. Const. art. II, §
17) (“disapprove of any
item or items of any
Bills making
appropriations of
money embracing
distinct items)

X

Massachusetts
(Mass. Const. art.
LXIII, § 5)
(“disapprove or reduce
items or parts of items
in any bill
appropriating money”)

Allows Veto of
NonAppropriations in
Appropriation Bills

467

X

X

X

215. The following states are not included in this chart, as they have no line-item veto
provision: (1) Indiana; (2) Nevada; (3) New Hampshire; (4) North Carolina; (5) Rhode
Island; and (6) Vermont.
216. The line-item veto in Maine can be overridden with a simple majority vote. Me.
Const. art. IV, Pt. 3, § 2-A.
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Appropriations
in Appropriation
Bills
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Allows Veto of
NonAppropriations in
Appropriation Bills

Allows
Reducing or
Changing
Appropriations

Missouri218
(Mo. Const. art. IV, §
26) (“object to one or
more items or portions
of items of
appropriation of
money in any bill”)

X

X

Montana
(Mont. Const. art. VI, §
10) (“may veto items in
appropriation bills”)

X

Michigan
(Mich. Const. Art. 5, §
19) (“disapprove any
distinct item or items
appropriating moneys
in any appropriation
bill”)

X

Minnesota
(Minn. Const. art. IV, §
23) (“If a bill …
contains several items
of appropriation of
money, he may veto
one or more of the
items”)

X

Mississippi
(Miss. Const., § 73)
(“veto parts of any
appropriation bill”)

X

217. The following states are not included in this chart, as they have no line-item veto
provision: (1) Indiana; (2) Nevada; (3) New Hampshire; (4) North Carolina; (5) Rhode
Island; and (6) Vermont.
218. Appropriations for free public schools, or for the payment of principal and
interest on the public debt are not subject to line-item veto in Missouri. Mo. Const. art. IV,
§ 26
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Allows Veto to
Appropriations
in Appropriation
Bills

Nebraska
(Neb. Const. art. IV, §
15) (“may disapprove
or reduce any item or
items of
appropriation”)

X

New Jersey
(N.J. Const. art. V, § I,
¶ 15) (“may object in
whole or in part to any
such item or items” of
appropriation)

X

Allows Veto of
NonAppropriations in
Appropriation Bills

X

New York
(N.Y. Const. art IV, §
7) (“may object to one
or more of . . . items”
in appropriation bills)

X

Ohio
(Ohio Const. art. II, §
16) (“may disapprove
any item or items in
any bill making an
appropriation of
money”)

Allows
Reducing or
Changing
Appropriations

X

New Mexico
(N.M. Const. art. IV, §
22) (“may . . . approve
or disapprove any part
or parts, item or items,
of any bill
appropriating money”)

North Dakota
(N.D. Const. art. V, §
9) (“may veto items in
an appropriation bill.”)

469

X

X

219. The following states are not included in this chart, as they have no line-item veto
provision: (1) Indiana; (2) Nevada; (3) New Hampshire; (4) North Carolina; (5) Rhode
Island; and (6) Vermont.
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State Constitution LineItem Veto Provisions220

Allows Veto to
Appropriations
in Appropriation
Bills

Allows Veto of
NonAppropriations in
Appropriation Bills

Oklahoma
(Okla. Const. art. VI, §
12) (may disapprove
“any item” of any bill of
appropriation.)

X

Oregon
(Or. Const. art. V, §
15a) (“power to veto
single items in
appropriation bills.”)

X

Pennsylvania
(Pa. Const. art. IV, §
16) (“power to
disapprove of any item
or items of any bill,
making appropriations
of money, embracing
distinct items, and the
part or parts of the bill
approved shall be the
law”)
South Carolina
(S.C. Const. art. IV, §
21) (may “approve any
one or more of the
items or sections
contained in any bill
appropriating money”)

X221

[Vol. 45:2

Allows
Reducing or
Changing
Appropriations

X222

X

220. The following states are not included in this chart, as they have no line-item veto
provision: (1) Indiana; (2) Nevada; (3) New Hampshire; (4) North Carolina; (5) Rhode
Island; and (6) Vermont.
221. While Pennsylvania’s item veto provision allows the governor to veto “any item”
of an appropriation bill, the vetoed item must—at minimum—include an appropriation.
Jubelirer v. Rendell, 598 Pa. 16, 22, 953 A.2d 514 (2008).
222. Although Pennsylvania’s item veto provision does not explicitly allow the
governor to reduce appropriation amounts, Pennsylvania’s highest court has found that the
item veto provision allows the governor to “decrease” an appropriation amount in an
appropriation bill. Id., at 48.
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State Constitution LineItem Veto Provisions223

Allows Veto to
Appropriations
in Appropriation
Bills

South Dakota
(S.D. Const. art. IV, §
4) (“may strike any
items of any bill passed
by the Legislature
making
appropriations”)
Tennessee
(Tenn. Const. art. III, §
18) (“may reduce or
disapprove the sum of
money appropriated by
any one or more items
or parts of items in any
bill appropriating
money”)
Texas
(Tex. Const. art. IV, §
14) (“may object to
one or more . . .
items” of
appropriation)
Utah
(Utah Const. art. VII, §
8) (“may disapprove
any item of
appropriation
contained in any bill”)
Virginia
(Va. Const. art. V, § 6)
(may “veto any
particular item or items
of an appropriation
bill”)

Allows Veto of
NonAppropriations in
Appropriation Bills

471

Allows
Reducing or
Changing
Appropriations

X

X

X

X

X

X

223. The following states are not included in this chart, as they have no line-item veto
provision: (1) Indiana; (2) Nevada; (3) New Hampshire; (4) North Carolina; (5) Rhode
Island; and (6) Vermont.

472

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

State Constitution LineItem Veto Provisions224

Allows Veto of
NonAppropriations in
Appropriation Bills

Allows
Reducing or
Changing
Appropriations

West Virginia
(W. Va. Const. art. VI,
§ 51) (“may veto [an
appropriation bill], or
he may disapprove or
reduce items or parts
of items contained
therein”)

X

X

Wisconsin
(Wis. Const. art. V, §
10) (“Appropriation
bills may be
approved in whole or
in part by the
governor.”)

X

Wyoming
(Wyo. Const. art. IV, §
9) (may “disapprove of
any item or items or
part or parts of any
[appropriation bill]”)

X

Washington
(Wash. Const. art. III,
§ 12) (“may object to
one or more sections
or appropriation
items”)

Allows Veto to
Appropriations
in Appropriation
Bills

[Vol. 45:2

X

224. The following states are not included in this chart, as they have no line-item veto
provision: (1) Indiana; (2) Nevada; (3) New Hampshire; (4) North Carolina; (5) Rhode
Island; and (6) Vermont.

2019]

SEPARATION OF POWERS IN NEW MEXICO

473

APPENDIX B: GENERAL APPROPRIATION ACT OF 2017
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS AND FINANCE COMMITTEE
SUBSTITUTE FOR HOUSE BILLS 2 AND 3
53RD LEGISLATURE – STATE OF NEW MEXICO – FIRST
SESSION, 2017
AN ACT

MAKING GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS AND AUTHORIZING
EXPENDITURES BY STATE AGENCIES REQUIRED BY LAW.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
NEW MEXICO:

Section 1. SHORT TITLE.--This act may be cited as the "General
Appropriation Act of 2017".
Section 2. DEFINITIONS.--As used in the General Appropriation Act of
2017:

[The author has omitted Section 2's definitions.]
Section 3. GENERAL PROVISIONS.--

[The author has omitted Section 3's General Provisions.]
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Item

General
Fund

Other
State
Funds

Intrnl Svc
Funds/
Inter- Agency
Trnsf

[Vol. 45:2

Federal
Funds

Total
Target

Section 4. FISCAL YEAR 2018 APPROPRIATIONS.—
LEGISLATIVE
LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL SERVICE:
Appropriations:
Subtotal

5,660.0
[5,660.0]

5,660.0
5,660.0

LEGISLATURE:
Appropriations:
Subtotal

1,386.0
[1,386.0]

1,386.0
1,386.0

LEGISLATIVE
FINANCE COMM.:
Appropriations:
Subtotal

4,220.3
[4,220.3]

4,220.3
4,220.3

SENATE CHIEF
CLERK:
Appropriations:
Subtotal

1,130.3
[1,130.3]

1,130.3
1,130.3

1,097.7
[1,097.7]

1,097.7
1,097.7

1,233.4
[1,233.4]

1,233.4
1,233.4

HOUSE CHIEF CLERK:
Appropriations:
Subtotal
LEGISLATIVE
EDUCATION STUDY
COMMITTEE
Appropriations:
Subtotal
LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL SERVICE:
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LEGISLATIVE
BUILDING SERVICES:
Appropriations:
Subtotal

4,054.9
[4,054.9]

4,054.9
4,054.9

TOTAL LEGISLATIVE

18,782.6

18,782.6
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